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Abstract
We develop an empirical framework in which we identify and estimate the effects of
treatments on outcomes of interest when the treatments are the result of strategic in-
teraction (e.g., bargaining, oligopolistic entry, peer effects). We consider a model where
agents play a discrete game with complete information whose equilibrium actions (i.e.,
binary treatments) determine a post-game outcome in a nonseparable model with endo-
geneity. Due to the simultaneity in the first stage, the model as a whole is incomplete and
the selection process fails to exhibit the conventional monotonicity. Without imposing
parametric restrictions or large support assumptions, this poses challenges in recovering
treatment parameters. To address these challenges, we first analytically characterize re-
gions that predict equilibria in the first-stage game with possibly more than two players,
and ascertain a monotonic pattern of these regions. Based on this finding, we derive
bounds on the average treatment effects (ATE’s) under nonparametric shape restrictions
and the existence of excluded exogenous variables. We also introduce and point identify
a multi-treatment version of local average treatment effects (LATE’s). We apply our
method to data on airlines and air pollution in cities in the U.S. We find that (i) the
causal effect of each airline on pollution is positive, and (ii) the effect is increasing in the
number of firms but at a decreasing rate.
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1 Introduction
We develop an empirical framework in which we identify and estimate the heterogeneous
effects of treatments on outcomes of interest where the treatments are the result of strategic
interaction (e.g., bargaining, oligopolistic entry, decisions in the presence of peer effects or
strategic effects). Treatments are determined as an equilibrium of a game and these strategic
decisions of players endogenously affect common or player-specific outcomes. For example,
one may be interested in the effects of newspaper entry on local political behaviors, the effects
of entry of carbon-emitting companies on local air pollution and health outcomes, the effects
of the presence of potential entrants in nearby markets on pricing or investment decisions of
incumbents, the effects of large supermarkets’ exit decisions on local health outcomes, and the
effects of provision of limited resources where individuals make participation decisions under
peer effects as well as based on their own gains from the treatment. As reflected in some of
these examples, our framework allows us to study externalities of strategic decisions, such as
societal outcomes resulting from firm behavior. Ignoring strategic interaction in treatment
selection processes may lead to biased, or at least less informative, conclusions about the
effects of interest.
We consider a model where agents play a discrete game of complete information, whose
equilibrium actions (i.e., a profile of binary endogenous treatments) determine a post-game
outcome in a nonseparable model with endogeneity. We are interested in various treatment
parameters of this model. In recovering these parameters, the setting of this paper poses
several challenges. First, the first-stage game posits a structure in which binary dependent
variables are simultaneously determined in threshold crossing models, thereby making the
model as a whole incomplete. This is related to the problem of multiple equilibria in the
game. Second, due to this simultaneity, the selection process does not exhibit the conven-
tional monotonic property a´ la Imbens and Angrist (1994). Furthermore, we want to remain
flexible with other components of the model. That is, we make no assumptions on the joint
distributions of the unobservables nor parametric restrictions on the player’s payoff function
and on how treatments affect the outcome. Also, we do not impose any arbitrary equilib-
rium selection mechanism as a way of solving the multiplicity of equilibria. In nonparametric
models with multiplicity or/and endogeneity, identification may be achieved using excluded
instruments with large support. Even though such a strong requirement can be met in prac-
tice, estimation and inference can still be problematic (Andrews and Schafgans (1998), Khan
and Tamer (2010)). We thus allow instruments and other exogenous variables to be discrete
and have small supports.
The first contribution of this paper is to analytically characterize regions that predict
equilibria in the first-stage game, which is an important initial step to address the challenges
described above. Complete analytical characterization of the equilibrium regions for more
than two players has not been studied in the literature.1 Under symmetry and strategic
substitutability restrictions on the payoff functions, we fully characterize the geometric prop-
erties of the regions in the space of unobservables, which describe the properties of equilibria
1To estimate payoff parameters, Berry (1992) partly characterizes equilibrium regions. To calculate the
bounds on these parameters, Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) simulate their moment inequalities model that are
implied by the shape of these regions, especially the regions for multiple equilibria. While their approaches
are enough for the purpose of their analyses, full analytical results are critical for the identification analysis
of the current paper.
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in the game. More importantly, we show that these regions exhibit a monotonic pattern in
terms of the number of players who choose to take the action—e.g., the number of entrants
in an entry game.
The second contribution of this paper is to show, after restoring a generalized version of
monotonicity in the selection process, how the model structure and the data can be infor-
mative about treatment parameters, such as the average treatment effects (ATE’s) and the
local ATE (LATE’s). We first establish the bounds on the ATE and other related parameters
with possibly discrete instruments of small support. We also show that tighter bounds on the
ATE can be obtained by introducing (possibly discrete) exogenous variables excluded from
the first-stage game. This is especially motivated when the outcome variable is affected by
externalities generated by the players. We can derive sharp bounds as long as the outcome
variable is binary. Further, with continuous instruments of large supports, we show that
multiplicity and endogeneity become irrelevant and the ATE is point identified. To derive in-
formative bounds, we impose nonparametric shape restrictions, such as conditional symmetry
and uniformity. These restrictions are particularly useful, since the outcome function features
a vector of treatments as its argument. The symmetry assumption is not needed if there exist
instruments that vary enough to offset the effect of strategic substitutability. We provide a
simple testable implication for the existence of such instruments variation for the case of
mutually independent payoff unobservables. The symmetry assumption may be relaxed by
assuming that strategic interaction occurs only within subgroups of players, thus allowing
for partial symmetry. Next, we introduce and point identify a multi-treatment version of the
LATE. The simultaneity in the selection process does not permit the usual equivalence result
by Vytlacil (2002) between the specification of a threshold-crossing selection rule and Imbens
and Angrist (1994)’s monotonicity assumption. Exploiting a monotonic pattern for the equi-
librium regions, however, enables us to recover the LATE for a treatment of “dichotomous
states.” A marked feature of our analyses is that for the sharp bounds on the ATE and the
identification of the LATE, player-specific instruments are not necessary.
Partial identification in single-agent nonparametric triangular models with binary endoge-
nous variables has been studied in Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) and Chesher (2005), among
others. Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) provide bounds on the ATE in this setting. In a more
general model, Vytlacil and Yildiz (2007) achieve point identification with an exogenous
variable that is excluded from the selection equation and has a large support. Our bound
analysis builds on these papers, but we allow for multi-agent strategic interaction as a key
component of the model. A few existing studies have extended a single-treatment model to a
multiple-treatment setting (e.g., Heckman et al. (2006), Jun et al. (2011)), but their models
maintain monotonicity in the selection process and none of them allow simultaneity among
the multiple treatments resulting from agents’ interaction as we do in this paper.
In interesting recent work, Pinto (2015), Heckman and Pinto (2015), and Lee and Salanie´
(2016) extend the monotonicity of the selection process in multi-valued treatments settings,
but they generally consider different types of treatment selection mechanisms than ours.
Pinto (2015) and Heckman and Pinto (2015) introduce unordered monotonicity, and Lee and
Salanie´ (2016) consider more general non-monotonicity. The latter paper does mention entry
games as one example of the treatment selection processes they allow, but they assume known
payoffs and bypass the multiplicity of equilibria, which is one of the emphases of our paper.
Also, Lee and Salanie´ (2016)’s main focus is on identification of marginal treatment effects
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with continuous instruments. In another important work, Chesher and Rosen (2017) consider
a wide class of generalized instrumental variable models in which our model falls and propose
a systematic method of characterizing sharp identified sets for admissible structures. The
focus of the present paper is to point and partially identify particular structural features (i.e.,
treatment parameters) analytically, and to investigate how the identification is related to the
exogenous sources of variation in the model and to the equilibrium characterization in the
treatment selection process. Calculating the sharp bounds on these treatment parameters
using their general approach involves projections of identified sets that may require additional
parametric restrictions. Lastly, Han (2018) considers identification of dynamic treatment
effects and optimal treatment regimes in a nonparametric dynamic model, where the dynamic
relationship causes non-monotonicity in the determination of each period’s outcome and
treatment.
Without triangular structures, Manski (1997), Manski and Pepper (2000) and Manski
(2013) also propose bounds on the ATE with multiple treatments under various monotonic-
ity assumptions, including an assumption on the sign of the treatment response. We take an
alternative approach that is more explicit about treatments interaction while remaining ag-
nostic about the direction of the treatment response. Our results suggest that, provided there
exist exogenous variation excluded from the selection process, the bounds calculated from
this approach can be more informative than those from their approach. Among these papers,
Manski (2013) is the closest to ours in that it considers multiple treatments and multiple
agents with simultaneous interaction, but with an important difference from our approach.
The interaction in his setting is through individuals which are the unit of observation. On
the other hand, our setting features the interaction through the treatment/player unit, and
the unit of observation is i.i.d. markets or regions in which the first-stage game is played and
from which the outcome variable may emerge.
Identification in models for binary games with complete information has been studied
in Tamer (2003) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Bajari et al. (2010), among others. The
present paper contributes to this literature by considering post-game outcomes, especially
those that are not of players’ direct concern. As related work that considers post-game out-
comes, Ciliberto et al. (2013) introduce a model where firms make simultaneous decisions of
entry and pricing upon entry. As a result, their model can be seen as a multi-agent extension
of a sample selection model. The model considered in this paper, on the other hand, is a
multi-agent extension of a model for endogenous treatments. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)
and Ciliberto et al. (2013) recover model primitives as their parameters of interest and they
impose parametric assumptions to facilitate their analyses. In contrast, our parameters of
interest are functionals of the primitives (but excluding the game parameters) and thus allow
our model to remain essentially nonparametric. Also a different approach to partial identi-
fication under multiplicity is employed, as their approach is not applicable to the particular
setting of this paper even if we are to assume a known distribution for the unobserved payoff
types.
To show the applicability of our method we take the bounds we propose to data on airline
market structure and air pollution in cities in the U.S. Aircrafts and airports land operations
are a major source of emissions and, thus, quantifying the causal effect of air transport on
pollution is of importance to policy makers. We explicitly allow market structure to be deter-
mined endogenously as the outcome of an entry game in which airlines behave strategically
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to maximize their profits and the resulting pollution in this market is not internalized by the
firms. Additionally, we do not impose any structure on the way airline competition affects
pollution and allow for heterogenous effects across firms. In other words, not only we allow
the effect of a different number of firms in the market on pollution to be nonlinear and not
restricted in any way, the identities of the firms in the market matter. To carry our applica-
tion we combine data from two sources. The first one contains airline information from the
Department of Transportation, which we use to construct a dataset of airlines presence in
each market. We then merge it with air pollution data in each airport from air monitoring
stations compiled by the Environmental Protection Agency. In our preferred specification
our outcome variable is a binary measure of the level of particulate matter in the air.
We consider three sets of ATE exercises to investigate different aspects of the relationship
between market structure and pollution in equilibrium. The first one simply quantifies the
effects of each airline operating as a monopolist compared to a situation in which the market
is not served by any airline. We find that the effect of each airline on pollution is positive and
statistically significant. We also find evidence that there is some heterogeneity in the effects
across the different airlines. The second set of exercises looks at the ATE’s of all potential
market structures on pollution. We find that the probability of high pollution is increasing
with the number of airlines in the market, but at a decreasing rate. Finally, the third set
of exercises quantifies the ATE of a single airline under all potential configurations of the
market in terms of its rivals. We observe that, in all cases, Delta entering a market has a
positive effect on pollution and this effect is decreasing with the number of rivals. The results
from the last two set of exercises are consistent with the results of a Cournot-competition
oligopolistic model in which incumbents accommodate new entrants by reducing the quantity
they produce.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, the parameters of
interest, and motivating examples. As the first main result of this paper, Section 3 presents
the analytical characterization of equilibrium regions for many players. Section 4 delivers
the partial identification results of this paper. We start by conducting the bound analysis on
the ATE’s for a two-player case and a binary dependent variable as an illustration. Then we
extend the results to a many-player case with a more general dependent variable. Section 5
relaxes the symmetry assumption introduced in the previous section, and Section 6 discusses
an extension of the model, point identification under large support, and relationship to Manski
(2013). The LATE parameter is introduced and identified in Section 7. Section 8 presents
a numerical illustration and Section 9 the empirical application on airlines and pollution.
Unless noted, the proofs of theorems and lemmas are collected in Appendix D.
In terms of notation, for a generic S˜-vector v ≡ (v1, ...vS˜), let v−s denote an (S˜ − 1)-
vector where s-th element is dropped from v, i.e., v−s ≡ (v1, ..., vs−1, vs+1, ..., vS˜). When
no confusion arises, we sometimes change the order of entry and write v = (vs,v−s) for
convenience. For a multivariate function f(v), the integral
´
A f(v)dv is understood as a
multi-dimensional integral over a set A contained in the space of v. Vectors in this paper are
row vectors.
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2 Setup and Motivating Examples
Let D ≡ (D1, ..., DS) ∈ D ⊆ {0, 1}S be a S-vector of observed binary treatments and
d ≡ (d1, ..., dS) be its realization, where S is fixed. We assume that D is predicted as a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of a complete information game with S players who make entry
decisions or individuals who choose to receive treatments.2 Let Y be an observed post-game
outcome that results from profileD of endogenous treatments. It can be an outcome common
to all players or an outcome specific to each player. Let (X,Z1, ..., ZS) be observed exogenous
covariates. We consider a model of a semi-triangular system:
Y = θ(D, X, D), (2.1)
Ds = 1 [ν
s(D−s, Zs) ≥ Us] , s ∈ {1, ..., S}, (2.2)
where s is an index for players or interchangeably for treatments. Without loss of generality
we normalize the scalar Us to be distributed as Unif(0, 1), and ν
s : RS−1+dzs → (0, 1]
and θ : RS+dx+1 → R are unknown functions that are nonseparable in their arguments. We
allow the unobservables (D, U1, ..., US) to be arbitrarily dependent to one another. Although
the notation suggests that the instruments Zs’s are player/treatment-specific they are not
necessarily required to be so for the analyses of this paper; see Appendix C for a discussion.
The exogenous variables X are variables excluded from all the equations for Ds. The existence
of X is not necessary but useful for the bound analysis of the ATE, and it can be motivated
when Y is generated from externalities incurred by the players and thus does not enter the
players’ first-stage payoff functions. There may be covariates W common to all the equations
for Y and Ds, which is suppressed for succinctness. Implied from the complete information
game, player s’s decision Ds depends on the decisions of all others D−s in D−s, and thus D
is determined by a simultaneous system. The model (2.1)–(2.2) is incomplete, i.e., the model
primitives and the covariates do not uniquely predict (Y,D) due to the possible existence of
multiple equilibria in the first-stage game of treatment selection. Moreover, the conventional
monotonicity in the sense of Imbens and Angrist (1994) is not exhibited in the selection
process due to simultaneity. The unit of observation, indexed by market or geographical
region i, is suppressed in all the expressions.
The potential outcome of receiving treatments D = d can be written as
Yd = θ(d, X, d), d ∈ D,
and D =
∑
d∈D 1[D = d]d. We are interested in the ATE and related parameters. With
the average structural function (ASF) E[Yd|X = x] for vector d ∈ D, the ATE can be written
as
E[Yd − Yd′ |X = x] = E[θ(d, x, d)− θ(d′, x, d′)], (2.3)
for d,d′ ∈ D. Another parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT): E[Yd − Yd′ |D = d′′, Z = z,X = x] for d,d′,d′′ ∈ D. Unlike the ATT or the
treatment of the untreated in the single-treatment case, d′′ does not necessarily equal d or
2While mixed strategy equilibria are not considered in this paper, it may be possible to extend the setup
to incorporate mixed strategies following the argument in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
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d′ here. One might also be interested in the sign of the ATE, which in this multi-treatment
case is essentially establishing an ordering among the ASF’s. Lastly, we are interested in the
LATE, which will be considered later after necessary concepts are introduced.
As an example of the ATE, we may choose d = (1, ..., 1) and d′ = (0, ..., 0) to measure
some cancelling-out effect, or we may be interested in more general nonlinear effects. Another
example would be choosing d = (1,d−s) and d′ = (0,d−s) for given d−s. In the latter
example, we can learn interaction effects of treatments, i.e., how much the average gain
(ATE) from treatment s is affected by other treatments: suppressing the conditioning on
X = x,
E
[
Y1,d−s − Y0,d−s
]− E [Y1,d′−s − Y0,d′−s] ,
where Yd is interchangeably written as Yds,d−s here. For example with d−s = (1, ..., 1) and
d′−s = (0, ..., 0), complementarity between treatment s and all the other treatments can be
represented as E
[
Y1,d−s − Y0,d−s
]−E [Y1,d′−s − Y0,d′−s] > 0. Sometimes, we instead want to
focus on learning about complementarity between two treatments, while averaging over the
remaining S − 2 treatments. This can be dealt with a more general framework of defining
the ASF and ATE by introducing a partial potential outcome; this is discussed in Appendix
A.
In identifying these treatment parameters, suppose we attempt to recover the effect of a
single treatment withD1 being a scalar in model (2.1)–(2.2) conditional on D2 = D−s = d−s,
and then recover the effects of multiple treatments by transitively using these effects of
single treatments. This strategy is not valid since D2 is a function of D1 and also due to
multiplicity. Therefore, the approaches in the literature with single-treatment, single-agent
triangular models are not directly applicable and a new theory is demanded in this more
general setting.
We provide two examples to which model (2.1)–(2.2) may apply; other examples men-
tioned in the introduction are discussed in Appendix B.
Example 1 (Externality of airline entry). In this example, we are interested in the effects
of airline competition on local air quality and health. Consider multiple airline companies
making entry decisions in local market i defined as a route that connects a pair of cities.
Let Yi denote the air pollution levels or average health outcomes of this local market. Let
Ds,i denote airline s’s decision to enter market i, which is correlated with some unobserved
characteristics of the local market that affect Yi. The parameter E[Yd,i − Yd′,i] captures the
effects of market structure on pollution or health. One interesting question would be whether
the ATE is nonlinear in the number of airlines as companies may share the market and
operate more efficiently when facing more competition. In related work, Schlenker and Walker
(2015) document how sensitively local health outcomes, such as acute respiratory diseases,
are affected by an exogenous change in flight schedules. Economic activity variables, such as
population and income, can be included in Wi, since they not only affect the outcomes but
also the entry decisions. The excluded variable Xi can be characteristics of the local market
that directly affect pollution or health levels, such as weather shocks or the share of pollution-
related industries in the local economy. We assume that, conditional on Wi, these factors
affect the outcome but do not enter the payoff functions of the airlines. The instruments Zs,i
are cost shifters that affect entry decisions. When Yi is a health outcome, pollution levels can
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be included in Xi.
Example 2 (Media and political behavior). In this example, the interest is in how media
affects political participation or electoral competitiveness. In county or market i, either Yi ∈
[0, 1] can denote voter turnout, or Yi ∈ {0, 1} can denote whether an incumbent is re-elected or
not. Let Ds,i denote the market entry decision by local newspaper type s, which is correlated
with unobserved characteristics of the county. In this example, Zs,i can be the neighborhood
counties’ population size and income, which is common to all players (Z1,i = · · · = ZS,i).
Lastly, Xi can include changes in voter ID regulations. Using a linear panel data model,
Gentzkow et al. (2011) show that the number of newspapers in the market significantly affects
the voter turnout but find no evidence whether it affects the re-election of incumbents. More
explicit modeling of the strategic interaction among newspaper companies can be important
to capture competition effects on political behavior of the readers.
3 Geometric Characterization of Equilibrium Regions
As an important step for the analyses of this paper, we formally characterize the regions in
the space of the unobservables that predict equilibria of the treatment selection process in
the first-stage game. The analytical characterization of the equilibrium regions when there
are more than two players (S > 2) can generally be complicated (Ciliberto and Tamer (2009,
p. 1800)) and has not been fully studied in the literature. Let Zs be the support of Zs.
We make the following assumptions on the first-stage nonparametric payoff function for each
s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
Assumption SS. For every zs ∈ Zs, νs(d−s, zs) is strictly decreasing in each element of
d−s.
Assumption SY1. For every zs ∈ Zs, νs(d−s, zs) = νs(d˜−s, zs) for any permutation d˜−s
of d−s.
Assumption SS asserts that the agents’ treatment decisions are produced in a game with
strategic substitutability. The strictness of the monotonicity is not important for our purpose
but convenient in making statements about the regions. Assumption SY1 imposes symmetry
(conditional on Zs = zs) in terms of the way opponents’ decisions enter players’ payoff
functions, which trivially holds in the two-player case and becomes crucial with many players
in the characterization by simplifying the regions of multiple equilibria. This assumption
is related to the exchangeability assumption in classical entry games (e.g., Berry (1992),
Kline and Tamer (2012)), which imposes that the payoff of a player is a function of the
number of other entrants, or the anonymity assumption in large games (e.g., Kalai (2004),
Menzel (2016)).3 In the language of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), although SY1 restricts
heterogeneity in the fixed competitive effects (i.e., how each of other entrants affects one’s
payoff), the nonseparability between d−s and zs in νs(d−s, zs) allows for heterogeneity in
how each player is affected by other entrants; this heterogeneity is related to the variable
competitive effects.
3This assumption is imposed as part of a monotonicity assumption (Assumption 3.2) in Kline and Tamer
(2012). The “symmetry of payoffs” has a different meaning in their paper.
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We begin by introducing some notations for equilibrium profiles. For k = 1, ..., S, let
ek be an S-vector of all zeros except for the k-th element which is equal to one, and let
e0 ≡ (0, ..., 0). For j = 0, ..., S, define ej ≡
∑j
k=0 ek, which is an S-vector where the first j
elements are unity and the rest are zero. For a set of positive integers, define a permutation
function σ : {n1, ..., nS} → {n1, ..., nS}, which has to be a one-to-one function. For example,(
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5
σ(n1) σ(n2) σ(n3) σ(n4) σ(n5)
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5
2 1 5 3 4
)
.
Let Σ be a set of all possible permutations. Define a set of all possible permutations of
ej = (ej1, ..., e
j
S) as
Mj ≡
{
dj : dj = (σ(ej1), ..., σ(e
j
S)) for σ(·) ∈ Σ
}
(3.1)
for j = 0, ..., S. Note Mj is constructed to be a set of all equilibrium profiles with j treatments
selected or j entrants, and it partitions D = ⋃Sj=0Mj . There are S!/j!(S − j)! distinct dj ’s
in Mj . For example with S = 3, d
2 ∈ M2 = {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} and d0 ∈ M0 =
{(0, 0, 0)}. Note d0 = e0 = (0, ..., 0) and dS = eS = (1, ..., 1).
Let D(z) ≡ (D1(z1), ..., DS(zS)) where z ≡ (z1, ..., zS) and Ds(zs) is the potential treat-
ment decision had the player s been assigned Zs = zs. We are interested in characterizing
a region R of U ≡ (U1, ..., US) in U ≡ (0, 1]S that satisfies U ∈ R ⇔ D(z) ∈ Mj for some
j. Let e˜j be a (S − 1)-vector where the first j elements are unity and the rest are zero for
j = 0, ..., S − 1. By Assumption SY1, νs(e˜j , zs) is the only relevant payoff function to define
the equilibrium regions. For notational simplicity, let νsj (zs) ≡ νse˜j (zs) ≡ νs(e˜j , zs). Now, for
each equilibrium profile, we define regions of U that are Cartesian products in U :
Rd0(z) ≡
S∏
s=1
(νs0(zs), 1] , RdS (z) ≡
S∏
s=1
(
0, νsS−1(zs)
]
and, given dj = (σ(ej1), ..., σ(e
j
S)) for some σ(·) ∈ Σ4 and j = 1, ..., S − 1,
Rdj (z) =
U : (Uσ(1), ..., Uσ(S)) ∈
{
j∏
s=1
(
0, ν
σ(s)
j−1 (zσ(s))
]}
×

S∏
s=j+1
(
ν
σ(s)
j (zσ(s)), 1
]
 .
(3.2)
For example, for σ(·) such that d1 = (σ(1), σ(0), σ(0)) = (0, 1, 0),
R010(z) =
(
ν11(z1), 1
]× (0, ν20(z2)]× (ν31(z3), 1] .
Lastly, define the region of all equilibria with j treatments selected or j entrants as
Rj(z) ≡
⋃
d∈Mj
Rd(z). (3.3)
4Sometime we use the notation djσ to emphasize the permutation function σ(·) from which dj is generated.
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(a) R0 (↑); R3 (↓) (b) R1 (c) R2 (d) ⋃3j=0Rj = U
Figure 1: Illustration of equilibrium regions in treatment selection process (Proposition 3.1)
for three players (S = 3).
In what follows, we establish the geometric properties of these regions.
Definition 3.1. Sets A and B are neighboring sets when there exists a point in one set whose
open ε-ball has nonempty intersection with the other set for any ε > 0.
Two sets with a nonempty intersection are trivially neighboring sets. Two disjoint sets
can possibly be neighboring sets when they share a “border”. Let Z be the support of
Z ≡ (Z1, ..., ZS).
Proposition 3.1. Consider the first-stage game (2.2). Under Assumptions SS and SY1, the
following holds: For every z ∈ Z (which is suppressed),
(i) Rj ∩Rj′ = ∅ for j, j′ = 0, ..., S with j 6= j′;
(ii) Rj and Rj−1 are neighboring sets for j = 1, ..., S;
(iii) Rj and Rj−t are not neighboring sets for j = t, ..., S and t ≥ 2;
(iv)
⋃S
j=0Rj = U .
This proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium regions. Figure 1 illustrates the results
of Proposition 3.1 for S = 3 withR0 = R000, R1 = R100∪R010∪R001, R2 = R110∪R101∪R011
and R3 = R111; also see Figures 7 and 8 for illustrations of individual Rdj ’s and regions of
multiple equilibria for this case.
For concreteness, we henceforth discuss Proposition 3.1 in terms of an entry game. By
(i) and the fact that MS and M0 are singleton, one can conclude that RdS and Rd0 are
regions of unique equilibrium. For j = 1, ..., S − 1, however, Rdj ∩ Rd˜j is not necessarily
empty for dj 6= d˜j . In particular, Rdj ∩ Rd˜j are regions of multiple equilibria. By (i), there
is no multiple equilibria where one equilibrium has j entrants and another has j′ entrants for
j′ 6= j. This is reminiscent of Berry (1992) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) in that
the equilibrium is unique in terms of the number of entrants. In other words, D(z) ∈ Mj
is uniquely predicted by U ∈ Rj(z). In the present paper, this result is obtained under
substantially weaker conditions on the payoff function than those in Berry (1992).
Proposition 3.1(ii)–(iii) assert that regions are neighboring sets when the number of en-
trants differs by one, but not when the number of entrants differs by more than one. By (i),
neighboring sets in (ii) are disjoint neighboring sets. For sets A and B, let A ∼ B denote
that A and B are neighboring sets. Note that A ∼ B implies B ∼ A and vice versa. Then
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Player s 1 2 3 4 5
Decision djs 1 1 0 1 0
Decision dj−1s 1 0 0 0 1
Table 1: An example of equilibria that differ by one entrant with S = 5 and j = 3.
(i)–(iii) immediately imply that Rj ’s are disjoint regions that lie in U in a monotonic fashion,
where all possible neighboring relationships are expressed as
R1 ∼ R2 ∼ · · · ∼ RS−1 ∼ RS . (3.4)
Proposition 3.1(iv) implies that an equilibrium always exists in a discrete game with strategic
substitutes, regardless of the number of players or the shape of the distribution of unobserv-
ables. That is, an econometric model for this game is coherent (Tamer (2003); Chesher and
Rosen (2012)), which extends the finding with a two-player game in the literature. Proposi-
tion 3.1(i) and (iv) imply that Rj for j = 1, ..., S partition the entire U . Note that, reversion
(or crossing) of the “border” of the partition does not occur, otherwise it violates (iii).
Proposition 3.1(i)–(iii) can be shown by utilizing the properties of sets defined as Cartesian
products (Proposition D.1 in Appendix D) and by observing that the pairs of equilibrium pro-
files in question obey certain rules. For example for dj and dj−1 in (ii), there always exists a
player s∗ such that djs∗ = 1 and d
j−1
s∗ = 0 by contradiction. For all other players, each equilib-
rium decision must be one of the following four pairs: (djs, d
j−1
s ) ∈ {(1, 1), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)}
∀s 6= s∗. One possibility of dj and dj−1 is where all the four pairs occur (although not
necessary) as displayed in the example inTable 1 with S = 5, j = 3 and s∗ = 2 (or 4). Now
to prove (ii), we show that Rdj ∼ Rdj−1 ∀dj ∈ Mj and ∀dj−1 ∈ Mj−1. For any Cartesian
products R =
∏S
s=1 rs and Q =
∏S
s=1 qs, it satisfies that R ∼ Q if and only if rs ∼ qs ∀s. But
it can be shown that for each of (djs, d
j−1
s ) pairs above ∀s, Us falls into respective intervals rs
and qs that satisfy rs ∼ qs. This is formally shown as part of the proof of Proposition 3.1 in
Appendix D.
Lastly, we introduce a uniformity assumption that is required in this multi-agent setting.
Assumption M1. For any zs, z
′
s ∈ Zs, either νs(d−s, zs) ≥ νs(d−s, z′s) ∀d−s ∈ D−s and
∀s ∈ {1, ..., S}, or νs(d−s, zs) ≤ νs(d−s, z′s) ∀d−s ∈ D−s and ∀s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
The uniformity is across d−s and s. Note that this assumption is weaker than a conven-
tional monotonicity assumption that νs(d−s, zs) is either non-decreasing or non-increasing in
zs for all d−s and s. Assumption M1 is justifiable especially when zs is chosen to be of the
same kind for all players. For example in an entry game, if zs is chosen to be each player’s
cost shifters, then the payoffs would decrease in their costs for all players.
Now we are ready to state the first main result of this paper. For j = 0, ..., S, define the
region of all equilibria with at most j entrants as
R≤j(z) ≡
j⋃
k=0
Rk(z).
Although this region is hard to express explicitly in general, it has a simple feature that
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serves our purpose:
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumptions SS, SY1 and M1 and for any given z, z′ ∈ Z, either
R≤j(z) ⊆ R≤j(z′) ∀j, or R≤j(z) ⊇ R≤j(z′) ∀j. (3.5)
Theorem 3.1 establishes a generalized version of monotonicity in the treatment selection
process. This theorem plays a crucial role in calculating the bounds on the treatment param-
eters, in showing sharpness of the bounds, and in introducing the LATE. In showing Theorem
3.1, since deriving the explicit expression of R≤j can be cumbersome, we infer its form by
focusing on the “border” of R≤j and using the results of Proposition 3.1; see the proof in
Appendix D.5
4 Partial Identification of the ATE
4.1 Preliminaries
To characterize the bounds on the treatment parameters, we make the following assumptions.
Unless otherwise noted, the assumptions hold for each s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
Assumption IN. (X,Z) ⊥ (d,U) ∀d ∈ D.
Assumption E. The distribution of (d,U) has strictly positive density with respect to
(w.r.t.) Lebesgue measure on RS+1 ∀d ∈ D.
Assumption EX. For each d−s ∈ D−s, νs(d−s, Zs)|X is nondegenerate.
Assumptions IN, EX and all the analyses below can be understood as conditional on W ,
the common covariates in X and Z = (Z1, ..., ZS). Assumption EX is related to the exclusion
restriction and the relevance condition of the instruments Zs.
We now impose two shape restrictions on the outcome function θ(d, x, d) via restrictions
on
ϑ(d, x;u) ≡ E[θ(d, x, d)|U = u]
a.e. u. These restrictions on the conditional mean are weaker than those that are directly
imposed on θ(d, x, d). Let X be the support of X.
Assumption M. For every x ∈ X , either ϑ(1,d−s, x;u) ≥ ϑ(0,d−s, x;u) a.e. u ∀d−s ∈ D−s
or ϑ(1,d−s, x;u) ≤ ϑ(0,d−s, x;u) a.e. u ∀d−s ∈ D−s
Assumption M holds with, but is not restricted to, a leading case of binary Y with a
threshold crossing model that satisfies uniformity:
Assumption M∗. (i) θ(d, x, d) = 1[µ(d, x) ≥ d] where d is scalar and Fd|U = Fd′ |U
for any d,d′ ∈ D; (ii) for every x ∈ X , either µ(1,d−s, x) ≥ µ(0,d−s, x) ∀d−s ∈ D−s or
µ(1,d−s, x) ≤ µ(0,d−s, x) ∀d−s ∈ D−s.
5Berry (1992) derives the probability of an event that the number of entrants is less than a certain value,
which can be written as Pr[U ∈ R≤j(z)] using our notation. This result is not sufficient for the purpose of
our paper.
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Assumption M∗ implies Assumption M. Assumption M can be stated in two parts, corre-
sponding to (i) and (ii) of Assumption M∗: (a) for every x and d−s, either ϑ(1,d−s, x;u) ≥
ϑ(0,d−s, x;u) a.e. u, or ϑ(1,d−s, x;u) ≤ ϑ(0,d−s, x;u) a.e. u; (b) for every x, each in-
equality statement in (a) holds for all d−s. For an outcome function with a scalar index,
θ(d, x, d) = θ˜(µ(d, x), d), part (a) is implied by d = d′ =  (or more generally Fd|U =
Fd′ |U ) for any d,d
′ ∈ D and E[θ˜(t, d)|U = u] being strictly increasing (decreasing) in t a.e.
u.6 Functions that satisfy the latter assumption include: strictly monotonic functions such as
transformation models θ˜(t, ) = r(t+ ) with r(·) being possibly unknown strictly increasing,
or their special case θ˜(t, ) = t+, allowing continuous dependent variables; and functions that
are not strictly monotonic such as models for limited dependent variables, θ˜(t, ) = 1[t ≥ ]
or θ˜(t, ) = 1[t ≥ ](t− ). There can be, however, functions that violate the latter assump-
tion but satisfy part (a). For example, consider a threshold crossing model with a random
coefficient: θ(d, x, ) = 1[φ()dβ> ≥ xγ>] where φ() is nondegenerate. When βs ≥ 0, then
E[θ(1,d−s, x, ) − θ(0,d−s, x, )|U = u] = Pr
[
xγ>
βs+d−sβ>−s
≤ φ() ≤ xγ>
d−sβ>−s
|U = u
]
and thus
nonnegative a.e. u, and vice versa. Part (a) also does not impose any monotonicity of θ in
d (e.g., d can be a vector).
Part (b) of Assumption M imposes mild uniformity as we deal with more than one treat-
ment. Uniformity is required across different values of d−s but not across s, which means
that different treatments can have different directions of monotonicity. More importantly,
knowledge on the direction of the monotonicity is not necessary, unlike Manski (1997) or
Manski (2013) where the semi-monotone treatment response is assumed for possible multiple
treatments.
Assumption SY. For every x ∈ X , ϑ(d, x;u) = ϑ(d˜, x;u) a.e. u for any permutation d˜ of
d.
For a benchmark analysis, we first maintain this conditional symmetry since it is conve-
nient to simplify the analysis given our incomplete model. This assumption imposes symmetry
in the functions as long as the observed characteristics X remain the same. In Section 5,
Assumption SY is dropped by assuming the existence of instruments that offset strategic
substitutability, and is relaxed by allowing partial symmetry. An assumption related to SY
is also found in Manski (2013).
Heuristically, the following is the idea of the bound analysis. For given d ∈ D, consider
E[Yd|X] = E[Yd|Z, X] = E[Y |D = d,Z, X] Pr[D = d|Z]
+
∑
d′ 6=d
E[Yd|D = d′,Z, X] Pr[D = d′|Z], (4.1)
where the first equality and Pr[D = d|Z, X] = Pr[D = d|Z] in the second equality are
by Assumption IN. In this expression, the counterfactual term E[Yd|D = d′,Z, X] can be
bounded as long as Y is bounded by a known interval (Manski (1990)) and instruments in Z
that are excluded from the equation for Y can then be used to narrow the bounds. The goal of
our analysis is to derive tighter bounds on the ATT’s E[Yd|D = d′,Z, X] by fully exploiting
6A single-treatment version of the latter assumption appears in Vytlacil and Yildiz (2007) (Assumption
A-4), which is weaker than assuming θ˜(t, ) is strictly increasing (decreasing) a.e. ; see Vytlacil and Yildiz
(2007) for related discussions.
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the structure of the model under the above assumptions, without necessarily requiring Y to
be bounded by a known interval. These bounds then can be used to construct bounds on the
ATE.
4.2 Analysis with Binary Y
As a leading case, we first consider model (2.1)–(2.2) with binary Y (consistent with As-
sumption M∗(i)) and no X to illustrate the main idea of our bound analysis. Moreover, with
binary Y , sharp bounds on the mean treatment parameters can be obtained in this model of
a triangular structure. Consider
Y = 1[µ(D) ≥ D], (4.2)
where, again, W is suppressed for succinctness.
We first define quantities that are identified directly from the data. For two realization
of z, z′ of Z, define
h(z, z′) ≡ E[Y |Z = z]− E[Y |Z = z′] (4.3)
= Pr[Y = 1|Z = z]− Pr[Y = 1|Z = z′],
which record the change in the distributions of Y as Z changes. To see this change relative
to the change in the distribution of D, define a joint propensity score as pM (z) ≡ Pr[D ∈
M |Z = z] for M ⊂ D and consider
pM≤j (z) < pM≤j (z
′) ∀j = 0, ..., S − 1, (4.4)
where M≤j ≡ ⋃jk=0Mk. Under Assumption EX, the existence of z, z′ that satisfy (4.4) is
guaranteed by Theorem 3.1, since pM≤j (z)− pM≤j (z′) = Pr[U ∈ R≤j(z)]−Pr[U ∈ R≤j(z′)]
by Assumption IN. Let the function sgn{h} take values −1, 0, 1 when h is negative, zero and
positive, respectively.
Lemma 4.1. In model (4.2) and (2.2), suppose Assumptions SS, SY1, M1, IN, E, EX, M∗
and SY hold, and h(z, z′) is well-defined. For z, z′ such that (4.4) holds, it satisfies that
sgn{h(z, z′)} = sgn{µ(dj)− µ(dj−1)}
for dj ∈Mj and dj−1 ∈Mj−1 with j = 1, ..., S.
Given the result of this lemma, we recover the signs of µ(dj)−µ(dj−1), i.e., the direction
of monotonicity in Assumption M∗(ii). This knowledge is useful to calculate bounds on the
unknown conditional mean terms (the ATT’s) in (4.1).
To illustrate the proof of this lemma, suppose S = 2; a formal proof can be found in
Section 4.3 in a more general setting. By Proposition 3.1, (1, 0) and (0, 1) are the values of
D that can be realized as possible multiple equilibria. Given this knowledge, we define
hM (z, z
′) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}|Z = z]
− Pr[Y = 1,D ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}|Z = z′],
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and
h11(z, z
′) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 1)|Z = z]− Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 1)|Z = z′],
h00(z, z
′) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 0)|Z = z]− Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 0)|Z = z′],
so that h(z, z′) = h11(z, z′)+h00(z, z′)+hM (z, z′). Making use of the conditional symmetry
assumption (SY), combiningD = (1, 0) andD = (0, 1) will conveniently manage the multiple
equilibria problem. Define
R11(z) ≡
{
U : U1 ≤ ν11(z1), U2 ≤ ν21(z2)
}
,
R00(z) ≡
{
U : U1 > ν
1
0(z1), U2 > ν
2
0(z2)
}
,
R10(z) ≡
{
U : U1 ≤ ν10(z1), U2 > ν21(z2)
}
,
R01(z) ≡
{
U : U1 > ν
1
1(z1), U2 ≤ ν20(z2)
}
.
Let µd ≡ µ(d) for brevity. Given Assumption M∗(i), let  be a r.v. such that F|U = Fd|U
for any d ∈ D. By Assumption IN,
h11(z, z
′) + h00(z, z′) = Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ R11(z)]− Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ R11(z′)]
+ Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ R00(z)]− Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ R00(z′)], (4.5)
where the equality uses the fact that R11 and R00 are disjoint and regions of unique equilib-
rium. By Assumption SY that µ10 = µ01, we have
hM (z, z
′) = Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ R10(z) ∪R01(z)]− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ R10(z′) ∪R01(z′)]. (4.6)
The main insight to obtain the results of Lemma 4.1 is as follows. By (4.3), h captures how
Pr[Y = 1|Z = z] changes in z. By h = h11 + h00 + hM and (4.5)–(4.6), such a change can
be translated into shifts in the regions of equilibria while the thresholds of  in each of h11,
h00 and hM remain unchanged by the exclusion restriction. Therefore, by inspecting how
Pr[Y = 1|Z = z] changes in z (i.e., the sign of h) relative to the changes in the equilibrium
regions R11 and R00 (i.e., the signs of h
D
11 and h
D
00), we recover the signs of µ11 − µ01 and
µ10 − µ00. In doing so, we use the crucial fact that the changes in the region R10 ∪ R01 are
offset with the changes in R11 and R00.
To be specific, since (z, z′) are chosen such that (4.4) holds, it satisfies that R11(z) ⊃
R11(z
′) and R00(z) ⊂ R00(z′) by Theorem 3.1.7 Then
∆+(z, z
′) ≡ {R10(z) ∪R01(z)} \
{
R10(z
′) ∪R01(z′)
}
= R00(z
′)\R00(z), (4.7)
∆−(z, z′) ≡
{
R10(z
′) ∪R01(z′)
} \ {R10(z) ∪R01(z)} = R11(z)\R11(z′), (4.8)
because, as z changes, an inflow of one region is an outflow of a region next to it. This set
algebra is illustrated in Figure 2. Then (4.6) becomes
7We assume for simplicity that this choice of z and z′ satisfies A∗ = ∅, where A∗ is defined in the proof of
a more general case (Lemma 4.2).
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0 1
1
R10(z)
R01(z)
R00(z)
R11(z)
U2
U1
(a) When Z = z
0 1
1
R10(z
′)
R01(z
′)
R00(z)
R11(z)
U2
U1
(b) When Z = z′
0 1
1
∆+(z, z
′)
∆−(z′, z)
U2
U1
(c) Difference of (a) and (b)
Figure 2: Inflow and outflow at change in Z in calculating h.
hM (z, z
′) = Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆+(z, z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆−(z, z′)], (4.9)
by the following general rule: for a uniform random vector U˜ and two sets B and B′ contained
in U˜ and for a r.v.  and set A ⊂ E ,
Pr[ ∈ A, U˜ ∈ B]− Pr[ ∈ A, U˜ ∈ B′] = Pr[ ∈ A, U˜ ∈ B\B′]− Pr[ ∈ A, U˜ ∈ B′\B].
(4.10)
Therefore by combining (4.9) with (4.5) applying (4.10) once more, we have
h(z, z′) = Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ ∆−(z, z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ ∆+(z, z′)]
− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆−(z, z′)] + Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆+(z, z′)]. (4.11)
Now, given Assumption E, Assumption M∗(ii) holds with µ(1, d−s) > µ(0, d−s) for any d−s
if and only if
h(z, z′) = Pr[µ01 ≤  ≤ µ11,U ∈ ∆−(z, z′)] + Pr[µ00 ≤  ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆+(z, z′)],
which is positive as is the sum of two probabilities. One can analogously show this for other
signs and we have the result of Lemma 4.1.8 Lastly, to gain efficiency in determining the sign
of h(z, z′) for z, z′ ∈ Z, define the integrated version of h as
H ≡ E [h(Z,Z ′) ∣∣pM≤j (Z) < pM≤j (Z ′) ∀j = 0, ..., S − 1] , (4.12)
where h(z, z′) = 0 whenever it is not well-defined. Then sgn{H} = sgn {µ11 − µ01} =
sgn {µ10 − µ00} in this illustration.
Using 4.1, now consider calculating the upper bound on Pr[Y00 = 1]. Suppose H ≥ 0.
Then by Lemma 4.1, µ00 ≤ µ10, µ00 ≤ µ01, and µ00 ≤ µ10 ≤ µ11. We can then derive the
8Note that in deriving the result of the lemma, a player-specific exclusion restriction is not crucial and one
may be able to relax it.
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upper bound on, e.g., Pr[Y00 = 1|D = (1, 0), Z] as
Pr[Y00 = 1|D = (1, 0), Z = z] = Pr[ ≤ µ00|D = (1, 0),Z = z]
≤ Pr[ ≤ µ10|D = (1, 0),Z = z] (4.13)
= Pr[Y = 1|D = (1, 0),Z = z],
which is smaller than one, the upper bound without the knowledge of the direction. Likewise,
using µ00 ≤ µ01 and µ00 ≤ µ11, we can calculate upper bounds on the other unobserved terms
Pr[Y00 = 1|D = d,Z] for d 6= (0, 0) analogous to the ones in (4.1). Consequently we have
Pr[Y00 = 1] ≤ Pr[Y = 1|Z = z].
Likewise, we can derive the lower bounds on Pr[Y00 = 1] when H ≤ 0.9
To be more general, we calculate the bounds on E[Ydj ] = Pr[Ydj = 1] for given d
j ∈ Mj
and j = 0, ..., S. We also show that the bounds are sharp. We consider the case H > 0; the
case H < 0 is symmetric and the case H = 0 is straightforward. Recall M≤j ≡ ⋃jk=0Mk and
let M>j ≡ ⋃Sk=j+1Mk = D\M≤j , which are understood to be empty sets for unconforming
values of j. Then one can show that Ldj ≤ Pr[Ydj = 1] ≤ Udj with
Udj ≡ inf
z∈Z
{
Pr[Y = 1,D ∈Mj |Z = z] +
∑
d′∈M>j
Pr[Y = 1,D = d′|Z = z]
+
∑
d′∈M≤j−1
Pr[D = d′|Z = z]
}
, (4.14)
Ldj ≡ sup
z∈Z
{
Pr[Y = 1,D ∈Mj |Z = z] +
∑
d′∈M≤j−1
Pr[Y = 1,D = d′|Z = z]
+
∑
d′∈M>j
Pr[D = d′|Z = z]
}
. (4.15)
We can simplify these bounds and show that they are sharp under the following assump-
tion.
Assumption C. (i) µd(·) and νd−s(·) are continuous; (ii) Z is compact.
For j′ = 0, ..., S − 1, the joint propensity score with M>j′ satisfies
pM>j′ (z) = Pr[U ∈ U\R≤j
′
(z)]. (4.16)
Under Assumption C and by Theorem 3.1, there exist vectors z¯ ≡ (z¯1, ..., z¯S) and z ≡
(z1, ..., zS) that satisfy
pM>j′ (z¯) = maxz∈Z
pM>j′ (z), pM>j′ (z) = minz∈Z
pM>j′ (z), (4.17)
9When H ≥ 0, the lower bounds on Pr[Y00 = 1] is trivially zero.
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∀j′ = 0, ..., S − 1.
Theorem 4.1. Given model (4.2) and (2.2), suppose the assumptions of Lemma 4.1 and
Assumption C hold. Also suppose H is well-defined and H ≥ 0. Then the bounds Udj and
Ldj in (4.14) and (4.15) simplify as
Udj = Pr[Y = 1,D ∈M>j−1|Z = z¯] + Pr[D ∈M≤j−1|Z = z¯],
Ldj = Pr[Y = 1,D ∈M≤j |Z = z] + Pr[D ∈M>j |Z = z],
and these bounds and thus the bounds on the ATE are sharp.
In a single treatment model, Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) use the propensity score as a
scalar conditioning variable, which summarizes all the exogenous variation in the selection
process and is convenient in simplifying the bounds and proving sharpness. In the context
of the current paper, however, this approach is invalid since Pr[Ds = 1|Zs = zs,D−s = d−s]
cannot be written in terms of a propensity score of player s as D−s is endogenous. We
instead use the vector Z as conditioning variables and establish partial ordering for the
relevant conditional probabilities (that define the lower and upper bounds) w.r.t. the joint
propensity score (4.16). In proving the sharpness of the bounds, Theorem 3.1 plays an
important role. Even though D is a vector that is determined by simultaneous decisions,
Theorem 3.1 combined with the partial ordering above establishes “monotonicity” of the
event U ∈ Rj(z) (and U ∈ U\Rj(z)) w.r.t. z.
Bounds when X is present in the model and its variation is additionally exploited will be
narrower than the bounds in Theorem 4.1, but showing sharpness of these bounds requires a
different approach to expressing bounds. This is discussed in the next section.
4.3 General Analysis
In this section we consider the full model (2.1)–(2.2), in which Y may no longer be binary
and the number of players may exceed two. We also exploit additional exogenous variation
that is generated from X conditional on Z. The existence of such variation is motivated by
the examples of externalities we discussed. We first introduce a generalized version of the
sign matching results (Lemma 4.1). For realizations x of X and z, z′ of Z, define
h(z, z′, x) ≡ E[Y |Z = z, X = x]− E[Y |Z = z′, X = x], (4.18)
hj(z, z
′, x) ≡ E[Y |D ∈Mj ,Z = z, X = x] Pr[D ∈Mj |Z = z]
− E[Y |D ∈Mj ,Z = z′, X = x] Pr[D ∈Mj |Z = z′]. (4.19)
The introduction of the quantity (4.19) is motivated by Proposition 3.1.10 Also, since Mj ’s
are disjoint,
∑S
j=0 Pr[D ∈ Mj |Z = ·] = 1 and thus h(z, z′, x) =
∑S
j=0 hj(z, z
′, x). Let
x = (x0, ..., xS) be an array of (possibly different) realizations ofX, i.e., each xj for j = 0, ..., S
is a realization of X, and define
h(z, z′;x) ≡
S∑
j=0
hj(z, z
′;xj).
10Even if Pr[D = dj |Z = z] 6= Pr[U ∈ Rdj (z)] due to multiple equilibria, it satisfies that Pr[D ∈ Mj |Z =
z] = Pr[U ∈ Rj(z)].
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Recall ϑ(d, x;u) ≡ E[θ(d, x, )|U = u], and for succinctness let ϑj(x;u) ≡ ϑ(ej , x;u) as ej
is the only relevant set of treatments under Assumption SY. We state the main lemma of
this section.
Lemma 4.2. In model (2.1)–(2.2), suppose Assumptions SS, SY1, IN, E, EX, M and SY
hold, and h(z, z′, x) and h(z, z′;x) are well-defined. For z, z′ such that (4.4) holds, it satisfies
that, for j = 1, ..., S,
(i) sgn{h(z, z′, x)} = sgn {ϑj(x;u)− ϑj−1(x;u)} a.e. u;
(ii) for ι ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, if sgn{h(z, z′;x)} = sgn{ϑk−1(xk−1;u)− ϑk(xk;u)} = ι ∀k 6= j, then
sgn{ϑj(xj ;u)− ϑj−1(xj−1;u)} = ι a.e. u.
Part (i) parallels Lemma 4.1. To show Lemma 4.2, we track the inflow and outflow in
each Rj(Z) when the value of Z changes. Specifically, based on Theorem 3.1 we equate
the inflow and outflow of Rj with those of R
≤j ’s in calculating (4.19) (and thus h(z, z′;x)),
which can be written as
hj(z, z
′, x) = E[Y |U ∈ Rj(z),Z = z, X = x] Pr[U ∈ Rj(z)]
− E[Y |U ∈ Rj(z′),Z = z′, X = x] Pr[U ∈ Rj(z′)], (4.20)
by Assumption IN. This approach is analogous to the simpler analysis shown in Section 4.2.
For part (i) of Lemma 4.2, suppose that ϑj(x;u) − ϑj−1(x;u) > 0 a.e. u ∀j = 1, ..., S.
Then by (D.7), h > 0. Conversely, if h > 0 then it should be that ϑj(x;u)− ϑj−1(x;u) > 0
a.e. u ∀j = 1, ..., S. Suppose not and suppose ϑj(x;u)−ϑj−1(x;u) ≤ 0 with positive measure
for some j. Then by Assumption M, this implies that ϑj(x;u) − ϑj−1(x;u) ≤ 0 ∀j a.e. u,
and thus h ≤ 0 which is contradiction. By applying similar arguments for other signs, we
have the desired result. The proof for Lemma 4.2(ii) is in Appendix D.
Using Lemma 4.2, note first that the sign of the ATE is identified by Lemma 4.2(i) since
E[Yd|X = x] = E[ϑ(d, x;U)]. Next, we calculate the bounds on E[Yd|X = x] with d = dj
for a given dj ∈Mj for some j = 0, ..., S. Consider
E[Ydj |X = x] = E[Y |D = dj ,Z = z, X = x] Pr[D = dj |Z = z]
+
∑
d′ 6=dj
E[Ydj |D = d′,Z = z, X = x] Pr[D = d′|Z = z]. (4.21)
Note that for d′ ∈Mj ,
E[Ydj |D = d′,Z = z, X = x] = E[Y |D = d′,Z = z, X = x] (4.22)
by Assumption SY. In order to bound E[Ydj |D = d′,Z = z, X = x] for d′ /∈Mj in (4.21), we
systematically use the results of Lemma 4.2. First, analogous to (4.12), define the integrated
version of h(z, z′;x) as
H(x) ≡ E [h(Z,Z ′;x) ∣∣pM≤j (Z) < pM≤j (Z ′) ∀j = 0, ..., S − 1] ,
where h(z, z′;x) = 0 whenever it is not well-defined. Then define the following sets of two
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consecutive elements of x that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 4.2: for j = 1, ..., S,
X 0j,j−1(ι) ≡ {(xj , xj−1) : sgn{H(x)} = ι, x0 = · · · = xS},
X 1j,j−1(ι) ≡ {(xj , xj−1) : sgn{H(x)} = ι, (xk, xk−1) ∈ X 0k,k−1(−ι) ∀k 6= j} ∪ X 0j,j−1(ι),
...
X tj,j−1(ι) ≡ {(xj , xj−1) : sgn{H(x)} = ι, (xk, xk−1) ∈ X t−1k,k−1(−ι) ∀k 6= j} ∪ X t−1j,j−1(ι),
and these sets are understood to be empty whenever h(z, z′;x) is not well-defined for any
pM≤j (z) < pM≤j (z
′) ∀j. Note that X tj,j−1(ι) ⊂ X t+1j,j−1(ι) for any t. Define Xj,j−1(ι) ≡
limt→∞X tj,j−1(ι).11 Then by Lemma 4.2,
if (xj , xj−1) ∈ Xj,j−1(ι), then sgn{ϑj(xj ;u)− ϑj−1(xj−1;u)} = ι a.e. u. (4.23)
Consider j′ < j for E[Ydj |D = dj′ ,Z, X] in (4.21). Then, for example, if (xk, xk−1) ∈
Xk,k−1(−1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j′ + 1 ≤ k ≤ j, then ϑj(x;u) ≤ ϑj′(x′;u) where x = xj and
x′ = xj′ by transitively applying (4.23). Therefore
E[Ydj |D = dj
′
,Z = z, X = x] = E[θ(dj , x, )|U ∈ Rdj′ (z),Z = z, X = x]
=
1
Pr[U ∈ Rdj′ (z)]
ˆ
R
dj
′ (z)
ϑj(x;u)du
≤ 1
Pr[U ∈ Rdj′ (z)]
ˆ
R
dj
′ (z)
ϑj′(x
′;u)du
= E[θ(dj
′
, x′, )|U ∈ Rdj′ (z),Z = z, X = x′]
= E[Y |D = dj′ ,Z = z, X = x′]. (4.24)
Symmetrically, for j′ > j, if (xk, xk−1) ∈ Xk,k−1(1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j + 1 ≤ k ≤ j′, then
ϑj(x;u) ≤ ϑj′(x′;u) where x = xj and x′ = xj′ . Therefore the same bound as (4.24) is
derived. Given these results, to collect all x′ ∈ X that yield ϑj(x;u) ≤ ϑj′(x′;u), we can
construct a set
x′ ∈{xj′ : (xk, xk−1) ∈ Xk,k−1(−1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j′ + 1 ≤ k ≤ j, xj = x}
∪ {xj′ : (xk, xk−1) ∈ Xk,k−1(1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j + 1 ≤ k ≤ j′, xj = x} .
Then we can further shrink the bound in (4.24) by taking the infimum over all x′ in this set.
The lower bound on E[Ydj |D = dj′ ,Z = z, X = x] can be constructed by simply choosing
the opposite signs in the preceding argument.
In conclusion, for bounds on the ATE E[Ydj |X = x], we can introduce the sets XLdj (x;d′)
11In practice, the formula for X tj,j−1 provides a natural algorithm to construct the set Xj,j−1 for the compu-
tation of the bounds. The calculation of each X tj,j−1 is straightforward as it is a search over a two-dimensional
space for (xj , xj−1) once the set X t−1j,j−1 from the previous step is obtained. Practitioners can employ truncation
t ≤ T for some T and use X Tj,j−1 as an approximation for Xj,j−1.
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and XU
dj
(x;d′) for d′ 6= dj as follows: for d′ ∈Mj′ with j′ 6= j,
XLdj (x;d′) ≡
{
xj′ : (xk, xk−1) ∈ Xk,k−1(−1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j′ + 1 ≤ k ≤ j, xj = x
}
∪ {xj′ : (xk, xk−1) ∈ Xk,k−1(1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j + 1 ≤ k ≤ j′, xj = x} , (4.25)
XUdj (x;d′) ≡
{
xj′ : (xk, xk−1) ∈ Xk,k−1(1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j′ + 1 ≤ k ≤ j, xj = x
}
∪ {xj′ : (xk, xk−1) ∈ Xk,k−1(−1) ∪ Xk,k−1(0) for j + 1 ≤ k ≤ j′, xj = x} , (4.26)
and for d′ ∈Mj ,
XLdj (x;d′) = XUdj (x;d′) ≡ {x}, (4.27)
where the last display is by (4.22). The following theorem summarize our results:
Theorem 4.2. In model (2.1)–(2.2), suppose the assumptions of Lemma 4.2 hold. Then the
sign of the ATE is identified, and the upper and lower bounds on the ASF and ATE with
d, d˜ ∈ D are
Ld(x) ≤ E[Yd|X = x] ≤ Ud(x)
and
Ld(x)− Ud˜(x) ≤ E[Yd − Yd˜|X = x] ≤ Ud(x)− Ld˜(x)
where, for given d† ∈ D,
Ud†(x) ≡ inf
z∈Z
{
E[Y |D = d†,Z = z, X = x] Pr[D = d†|Z = z]
+
∑
d′ 6=d†
inf
x′∈XU
d† (x;d
′)
E[Y |D = d′ ,Z = z, X = x′] Pr[D = d′ |Z = z]
}
,
Ld†(x) ≡ sup
z∈Z
{
E[Y |D = d†,Z = z, X = x] Pr[D = d†|Z = z]
+
∑
d′ 6=d†
sup
x′∈XL
d† (x;d
′)
E[Y |D = d′ ,Z = z, X = x′] Pr[D = d′ |Z = z]
}
.
When the variation in Z is only used in deriving the bounds, Xk,k−1(ι) should simply
reduce down to X 0k,k−1(ι) in the definition of XLdj (x;d′) and XUdj (x;d′). When Y is binary
with no X, such bounds are equivalent to (4.14) and (4.15). The variation in X given
Z yields substantially narrower bounds than the sharp bounds established in Theorem 4.1
under Assumption C. The resulting bounds, however, are not automatically implied to be
sharp from Theorem 4.1, since they are based on a different DGP and the additional exclusion
restriction.
Remark 4.1. Maintaining that Y is binary, sharp bounds on the ATE with variation in X
can be derived assuming that the signs of ϑ(d, x;u)− ϑ(d′, x′;u) are identified for d,d′ ∈ D
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and x, x′ ∈ X via Lemma 4.2. To see this, define
X˜Ud (x;d′) ≡
{
x′ : ϑ(d, x;u)− ϑ(d′, x′;u) ≤ 0 a.e. u} ,
X˜Ld (x;d′) ≡
{
x′ : ϑ(d, x;u)− ϑ(d′, x′;u) ≥ 0 a.e. u} ,
which are identified by assumption. Then by replacing X id(x;d′) with X˜ id(x;d′) (for i ∈
{U,L}) in Theorem 4.2, we may be able to show that the resulting bounds are sharp. Since
Lemma 4.2 implies that X i
dj
(x;d′) ⊂ X˜ i
dj
(x;d′) but not necessarily X i
dj
(x;d′) ⊃ X˜ i
dj
(x;d′),
these modified bounds and the original bounds in Theorem 4.2 do not coincide. This con-
trasts with the result of Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) for a single-treatment model, and the
complication lies in the fact that we deal with an incomplete model with a vector treatment.
When there is no X, Lemma 4.2(i) establishes equivalence between the two signs, and thus
X i
dj
(x;d′) = X˜ i
dj
(x;d′) for i ∈ {U,L}, which results in Theorem 4.1. Relatedly, we can also
exploit variation in W , namely variables that are common to both X and Z (with or without
exploiting excluded variation of X). This is related to the analysis of Chiburis (2010) and
Mourifie´ (2015) in a single-treatment setting. One caveat of this approach is that, similar to
these papers, we need an additional assumption that W ⊥ (,U).
Remark 4.2. When X does not have enough variation, an assumption that Y ∈ [Y , Y ] with
known endpoints can be introduced to calculate the bounds. To see this, suppose we do not
use the variation in X and suppose H(x) ≥ 0. Then ϑk(x;u) ≥ ϑk−1(x;u) ∀k = 1, ..., S by
Lemma 4.2(i) and by transitivity, ϑj′ ≥ ϑj for any j′ > j. Therefore, we have
E[Ydj |X = x] ≤
∑
d∈Mj
E[Y |D = d,Z, X = x] Pr[D = d|Z]
+
∑
d′∈Mj′ :j′>j
E[Y |D = d′,Z, X = x] Pr[D = d′|Z]
+
∑
d′∈Mj′ :j′<j
E[Ydj |D = d′,Z, X = x] Pr[D = d′|Z]. (4.28)
Without using variation in X, we can bound the last term in (4.28) by Y ∈ [Y , Y ]. This is
done in Section 4.2 with θ(d, x, ) = 1[µd ≥ ] and ϑj(x;u) = F|U (µej |u). Another example
would be when Y ∈ [0, 1] as in Example 2.
Remark 4.3. It may be possible to point identify the ATE by extending the result of Theorem
4.2 using X with larger support. For example, Lemma 4.2 enables us to find x′ such that
ϑj(x;u) = ϑj′(x
′;u) (j 6= j′), from which we can point identify the ATT:
E[Ydj |D = dj
′
,Z = z, X = x] =
1
Pr[U ∈ Rdj′ (z)]
ˆ
R
dj
′ (z)
ϑj(x;u)du
=
1
Pr[U ∈ Rdj′ (z)]
ˆ
R
dj
′ (z)
ϑj′(x
′;u)du
= E[Y |D = dj′ ,Z = z, X = x′].
The existence of such x′ requires sufficient variation of X conditional on Z, which is rem-
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Figure 3: Illustration of Assumptions ASY and ASY∗.
iniscent of Vytlacil and Yildiz (2007). This approach is alternative to the use of the large
variation of Z for point identification, which is discussed in Section 6.3 below.
5 Relaxing Symmetry
We propose two different ways to relax the conditional symmetry assumption in the outcome
function (Assumption SY) introduced in the preceding section.
5.1 Compensation of Strategic Substitutability
Assumption SY can be dropped when there exists variation in Z that offsets the effect of
strategic substitutability. With such variation, we show that regions of multiple equilibria
are not involved in calculating h(z, z′;x) and thus Assumption SY is no longer required in
the bound analysis of the ATE.
Assumption ASY. For j = 1, ..., S − 1, there exist z, z′ ∈ Z such that νsj−1(z′s) ≤ νsj (zs)
∀s.
Assumption ASY states that there exists variation in Z that offsets the effect of strategic
substitutability (Assumption SS), which can be stated as νsj−1(zs) > ν
s
j (zs). For example in
an entry game with Zs being cost shifters, Assumption ASY may hold with z
′
s > zs ∀s. In
this example, all players may become less profitable with an increase in cost from government
regulation, while for one player it becomes unprofitable to enter and that player’s absence from
the market does not help overturn the decrease on the other firms’ profits. Assumption ASY
is illustrated in Figure 3 with νs0(z
′
s) < ν
s
1(zs) for s = 1, 2. Assumption ASY has a simple
testable sufficient condition provided that the unobservables in the payoffs are mutually
independent.
Assumption ASY∗. There exist z, z′ ∈ Z such that
Pr[D = (0, ..., 0)|Z = z] + Pr[D = (1, ..., 1)|Z = z′] > 1. (5.1)
Lemma 5.1. When Us ⊥ Ut for all s 6= t, Assumption ASY∗ implies Assumption ASY.
The mutual independence of Us’s (conditional on W ) is useful in inferring the relation-
ship between players’ interaction and instruments from the observed decisions of players.
The intuition for the sufficiency of Assumption ASY2 is as follows. As long as there is no
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dependence in unobserved types, (5.1) dictates that the variation of Z is large enough to
offset strategic substitutability, because otherwise the payoffs of players cannot move in the
same direction, thus not resulting in the same decisions.12
Under Assumption ASY, we can apply an analogous strategy as in the symmetric case in
Section 4 to determine the direction of monotonicity and ultimately calculate the bounds on
the ATE. For example, the following lemma replaces Lemma 4.2(i):
Lemma 5.2. In model (2.1)–(2.2), suppose Assumptions SS, SY1, M1, IN, E, EX and M
hold, and h(z, z′, x) is well-defined. For z, z′ such that Assumption ASY and (4.4) hold, it
satisfies that
sgn{h(z, z′, x)} = sgn {ϑ(1,d−s, x;u)− ϑ(0,d−s, x;u)}
a.e. u ∀d−s ∈ D−s and ∀s = 1, ..., S.
Lemma 4.2(ii) can be similarly modified. When Assumption ASY holds, it can be shown
that
R∗dj (z) ∩R∗d˜j (z′) = R∗dj (z′) ∩R∗d˜j (z) = ∅ (5.2)
for dj 6= d˜j , where R∗d(·) is the region that predicts D = d.13 This is shown as part of the
proof of the above lemma. The result in (5.2) liberates us from concerning about the regions
of multiple equilibria and about a possible change in equilibrium selection from the change
in Z. Therefore, we can separately consider each dj when calculating h(z, z′, x).
Remark 5.1. The condition (5.2) is related to stability in the equilibrium selection mecha-
nism from a change in Z: For j = 1, ..., S − 1, there exist z, z′ ∈ Z such that the region that
predicts D = dj is invariant for Z ∈ {z, z′} within Rj(z) ∩Rj(z′) ∀dj ∈ Mj. In fact, this
condition is equivalent to (5.2) and trivially holds when Z varies sufficiently enough that the
regions of multiple equilibria do not intersect with each other. This occurs when Assumption
ASY holds.
5.2 Partial Symmetry: Interaction Within Groups
In some cases, strategic interaction may occur within groups of players (i.e., treatments).
In the airline example, it may be the case that larger airlines interact with one another as
a group, so do smaller airlines as a different group, but there may be no interaction across
the groups.14 In general for K groups of players/treatments, we consider, with player index
s = 1, ..., Sg and group index g = 1, ..., G,
Y = θ(D1, ...,DG, X, D), (5.3)
Dgs = 1
[
νs,g(Dg−s, Z
g
s ) ≥ Ugs
]
, (5.4)
12The requirement of Z variation in (5.1) is significantly weaker than the large support assumption invoked
for an identification at infinity argument (Assumption EX∗ below).
13Unlike Rd(z) which is purely determined by the payoffs ν
s
d−s(zs), R
∗
d(z) is unknown to the econometrician
even if all the players’ payoffs had been known, since the equilibrium selection rule is unknown.
14We can also easily extend the model so that smaller airlines take larger airlines’ entry decisions as given
and play their own entry game, which may be more reasonable to assume.
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where each Dg ≡ (Dg1, ..., DgSk) is the treatment vector of group g and D ≡ (D1, ...,DG).
This model generalizes the model (2.1)–(2.2). It can also be seen as a special case of ex-
ogenously endowing an incomplete undirected network structure, where players interact with
one another within each of complete sub-networks. In this model, each group can differ in
the number (Sg) and identity of players (under which the entry decision is denoted by D
g
s).
Also, the unobservables U g ≡ (Ug1 , ..., UgS) can be arbitrarily correlated across groups, in
addition to the fact that Ugs ’s can be correlated within group g and U ≡ (U1, ...,UG) can be
correlated with D. This partly relaxes the independence assumption across markets, which
is frequently imposed in the entry game literature.
To calculate the bounds on the ATE E[Yd − Yd′ |X = x] we apply the results in Theorem
4.2, by adapting those assumptions to the current extension. We modify Assumption SY
so that (the conditional mean of) the outcome function is symmetric within each group but
not across groups. This in turn can be seen as relaxation of Assumption SY. Let D−g ≡
(D1, ...,Dg−1,Dg+1, ...,DG) and its realization be d−g. Then the assumption is stated as
follows.
Assumption SY∗. For g = 1, ..., G and every x ∈ X , ϑ(dg,d−g, x;u) = ϑ(d˜g,d−g, x;u) a.e.
u for any permutation d˜g of dg.
Under this partial conditional symmetry assumption, the bound on the ASF can be calcu-
lated by iteratively applying the previous results to each group.15 Assumptions SS, SY1, EX
and M can be modified so that they hold for treatments with within-group interaction. In par-
ticular, Assumption EX can be modified as follows: for each dg−s ∈ Dg−s, νs,g(dg−s, Zgs )|X,Z−g
is nondegenerate, where Z ≡ (Zg,Z−g). That is, there must be group-specific instruments
that are excluded from other groups.16
We briefly show how to modify the previous bound analysis with binary Y and no X for
simplicity. Analogous to the previous notation, let Mgj be the set of equilibria with j entrants
in group g and let Mg,≤j ≡ ⋃jk=0Mgk . Suppose G = 2, and d1 ∈ {0, 1}S1 and d2 ∈ {0, 1}S2 .
Consider the ASF E[Yd] = E[Yd1,d2 ] with d
1 ∈ M1j−1 and d2 ∈ M2k−1 for some j = 1, ..., S1
and k = 1, ..., S2. To calculate its bounds, we can bound E[Yd|D = d′,Z] in (4.1) for d˜ 6= d
by sequentially applying the analysis of Section 4 in each group. First, consider d˜ = (d˜1,d2)
with d˜1 ∈M1j . We apply Lemma 4.2 for the D1 portion after holding D2 = d2. Suppose
Pr[Y = 1|D2 = d2,Z1 = z1,Z2 = z2]− Pr[Y = 1|D2 = d2,Z1 = z1′,Z2 = z2] ≥ 0,
Pr[D1 ∈M1,>j−1|Z1 = z1]− Pr[D1 ∈M1,>j−1|Z1 = z1′] > 0,
then we have µd˜1,d2 ≥ µd1,d2 . The proof of Lemma 4.2 can be adapted by holding D2 = d2
in this case, because there is no strategic interaction across groups and therefore the multiple
equilibria problem only occurs within each group. Note that this strategy still allows for
dependence between D1 and D2 even after conditioning on Z due to dependence between
15This assumption can be further relaxed by adapting Assumption ASY in the framework of this section.
16We maintain Assumption R in the current setting since the assumption is equivalent to assuming a rank
invariance within each group, i.e., dg,d−g = d˜g,d−g ∀dg, d˜g ∈ {0, 1}Sg and g = 1, ..., G.
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U1 and U2. Then,
Pr[Yd1,d2 = 1|D = (d˜1,d2),Z = z] = Pr[ ≤ µd1,d2 |D = (d˜1,d2),Z = z]
≤ Pr[ ≤ µ
d˜1,d2
|D = (d˜1,d2),Z = z] (5.5)
= Pr[Y = 1|D = (d˜1,d2),Z = z].
Next, consider d = (d1,d2) and d˜ = (d˜1, d˜2) with d˜2 ∈ M2k and the other elements as
previously determined. Then, by applying Lemma 4.2 this time forD2 after holdingD1 = d˜1,
we have µ
d˜1,d˜2
≥ µ
d˜1,d2
by supposing
Pr[Y = 1|D1 = d˜1,Z1 = z1,Z2 = z2]− Pr[Y = 1|D1 = d˜1,Z1 = z1,Z2 = z2′] ≥ 0,
Pr[D2 ∈M2,>j−1|Z2 = z2]− Pr[D2 ∈M2,>j−1|Z2 = z2′] > 0.
Then,
Pr[Yd1,d2 = 1|D = (d˜1, d˜2),Z = z] ≤ Pr[ ≤ µd˜1,d2 |D = (d˜1, d˜2),Z = z]
≤ Pr[ ≤ µ
d˜1,d˜2
|D = (d˜1, d˜2),Z = z] (5.6)
= Pr[Y = 1|D = (d˜1, d˜2),Z = z],
where the first inequality is by (5.5). Note that in deriving the upper bound in (5.6), it is
important that at least the two groups share the same signs of within-group h’s and hD’s.
This is clearly a weaker requirement than imposing Assumption SY.
6 Discussions
6.1 Player-Specific Outcomes
So far, we considered a scalar Y that may represent an outcome common to all players in a
given market or a geographical region. The outcome, however, can also be an outcome that
is specific to each player. In this regard, consider a vector of outcomes Y = (Y1, ..., YS) where
each element Ys is a player-specific outcome. An interesting example of this setting may be
where Y is also an equilibrium outcome from strategic interaction not only through D but
also through itself. In this case, it would become important to have a vector of unobservables
even after assuming e.g., rank invariance, since we may want to include D = (1,D, ..., S,D),
where s,D is an unobservable directly affecting Ys.
17 We may also want to include a vector
of observables of all players X = (X1, ..., XS), where Xs directly affects Ys. Then, interaction
among Ys can be modeled via a reduced-form representation:
Ys = θs(D,X, D), s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
In the entry example, the first-stage scalar unobservable Us may represent each firm’s unob-
served fixed cost (while Zs captures observed fixed cost). The vector of unobservables in the
player-specific outcome equation represents multiple shocks, such as the player’s demand and
17In this case, Assumption R should be imposed on s,D for each s.
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variable cost shocks, and other firms’ variable cost and demand shocks. Unlike in a linear
model, it would be hard to argue that these errors are all aggregated as a scalar variable in
this nonlinear outcome model, since it is not known in which fashion they enter the equation.
6.2 Relation to Manski’s Work
Manski (2013) introduces a framework for social interaction where responses (i.e., outcomes)
of agents are dependent on one another through their treatments. The framework relaxes the
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) by allowing interaction across the units.
Our framework is similar to Manski (2013) in that we also allow interaction among outcomes
of players through their treatments, as we discuss in Section 6.1. The difference is that we
consider interaction across treatment/player unit s, whereas he considers interaction across
observational unit i. Furthermore, we explicitly model the selection process of how treatments
are determined simultaneously through players’ strategic interaction. His model, following his
earlier work (Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000)), stays silent about this process.
Despite the difference, the two settings share a similar spirit in departing from the SUTVA.
The shape restrictions we impose are related to the assumptions of Manski (2013) for the
treatment response, which we compare here. First of all, Assumption SY appears in Manski
as an anonymity assumption. Also, we find that Assumptions SY and SY∗ are related to the
constant TR (CTR) assumption in Manski, although he assumes anonymity separate from
this assumption. The CTR assumption states that, with d = (di)
N
i=1,
c(d) = c(d′) =⇒ Yd = Yd′ .
As noted in Manski, c(d) is an effective treatment in that, as long as c(d) stays constant, the
response does not change. SY and SY∗ can be restated using this concept with a suitable
choice of c(d): with d = (ds)
S
s=1 ,
c(d) = c(d′) =⇒ E[Yd|X = x,U = u] = E[Yd′ |X = x,U = u] (6.1)
for given x ∈ X and a.e. u, where c(d) is chosen such that the game for treatment decisions has
a unique equilibrium in terms of c(d). The conditional symmetry assumption (Assumption
SY) can be seen as one example of this, where the game has a unique equilibrium in terms
of c(d) that is invariant to permutations, such as the number of players who choose to
take the action (c(d) =
∑S
s=1 ds). Likewise, SY
∗ corresponds to c(d) = (c1(d), ..., cG(d))
with cg(d) =
∑Sg
s=1 d
g
s. There can certainly be other choices of c(d) that deliver a unique
equilibrium in the game, although we do not explore this further.
6.3 Point Identification of the ATE
When there exist player-specific excluded instruments with large support, we point identify
the ATE’s. In this case, the shape restrictions (especially on the outcome function) are not
needed. The following assumption needs to hold for each s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
Assumption EX∗. For each d−s ∈ D−s, νs(d−s, Zs)|(X,Z−s) has an everywhere positive
Lebesgue density.
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Assumption EX∗ is stronger than Assumption EX. It imposes not only the exclusion
restriction of EX but also a player-specific exclusion restriction and large support.
Theorem 6.1. In model (2.1) and (2.2), suppose Assumptions IN, E and EX∗ hold. Then
the ATE in (2.3) is identified.
The identification strategy is to exploit the large variation of player specific instruments
based on Assumption EX∗, which simultaneously solves the multiple equilibria and the en-
dogeneity problems. Suppose S = 2 and Zs is scalar for illustration; the general case can be
proved analogously. For example, to identify E[Y11|X], consider
E[Y |D = (1, 1), X = x,Z = z] = E[Y11|D = (1, 1), X = x,Z = z]
= E[θ(1, 1, x, 11)|ν1(1, z1) ≥ U1, ν2(1, z2) ≥ U2]
→ E[θ(1, 1, x, 11)] = E[Y11|X = x],
where the second equation is by Assumption IN, and the convergence is by Assumption EX∗
with z1 → ∞ and z2 → ∞. Likewise, E[Y00|X = x] can be identified. The identification of
E[Y10|X = x] and E[Y01|X = x] can be achieved by similar reasoning. Note that D = (1, 0)
or D = (0, 1) can be predicted as an outcome of multiple equilibria. When either (z1, z2)→
(∞,−∞) or (z1, z2) → (−∞,∞) occurs, however, a unique equilibrium is guaranteed as a
dominant strategy, i.e., D = (1, 0) or D = (0, 1), respectively. Based on these results, we can
(point) identify all the ATE’s.
7 The LATE
The result of Theorem 3.1 on the equilibrium regions can be used to establish a framework
that defines the LATE parameter for multiple treatments that are generated by strategic
interaction. In this section, given model (2.1)–(2.2), we only maintain the assumptions
on the payoff functions in the equations for Ds, but not the assumptions on the outcome
functions in the equation for Y . In particular, we no longer require Assumptions M and
SY. In the case of a single binary treatment, there is well-known equivalence between the
LATE monotonicity assumption and the specification of a selection equation (Vytlacil (2002)).
This equivalence result is inapplicable to our setting due to the simultaneity in the first
stage.18 But Proposition 3.1 implies that, under Assumptions SS and SY1, there is in fact
a monotonic pattern in the way the equilibrium regions lie in the space of U as written
in (3.4). This generalized monotonicity, formalized in Theorem 3.1, allows us to establish
equivalence between a version of the LATE monotonicity assumption and the simultaneous
selection model (2.2).
We first introduce a relevant counterfactual outcome that can be used in defining the
LATE parameter. For M ⊆ D, introduce a selection variable DM ∈ M that selects an
equilibriumDM = d when facing a set of equilibria, M . This variable is useful in decomposing
the event D = d into two sequential events: D = d is equivalent to the event that D ∈ M
18For instance in a two-player entry game, when cost shifters Z1 and Z2 increase, it may be the case that
in one market only the first player enters given this increase as her monopolistic profit offsets the increased
cost, while in another market only the second player enters by the same reason applied to this player. The
direction of monotonicity is reversed in these two markets.
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and DM = d. Trivially, we have DD = D. When M ( D is not a singleton, DM is not
observed precisely because the equilibrium selection mechanism is not observed in general.19
Using DM , we define a joint counterfactual outcome YM as an outcome had D been an
element in M :
YM =
∑
d∈M
1[DM = d]Yd. (7.1)
Conditional onD ∈M , YM is assigned to be one of the usual counterfactual outcome Yd based
on the equilibrium being selected. When M = D, we can write Y = YD =
∑
d∈D 1[D = d]Yd,
which yields the standard expression that relates the observed outcome with the potential
outcomes. Moreover, for any partition {M˜k}Kk=1 such that
⋃K
k=1 M˜k = D, we can express
∑
d∈D
1[D = d]Yd =
K∑
k=1
∑
d∈M˜k
1[D ∈ M˜k]1[DM˜k = d]Yd =
K∑
k=1
1[D ∈ M˜k]YM˜k ,
where the first equality is by the equivalence of the events mentioned above and the second
equality follows from (7.1). Therefore, we can establish the following relationship:
Y =
K∑
k=1
1[D ∈ M˜k]YM˜k , (7.2)
that is, YM˜k is observed when D ∈ M˜k.
Now, consider a treatment of dichotomous states (e.g., dichotomous market structures):
for j = 0, ..., S − 1,
D ∈M>j vs. D ∈M≤j ,
where M≤j ≡ ⋃jk=0Mk and M>j ≡ ⋃Sk=j+1Mk are previously defined; e.g., for S = 2 and
j = 1, M≤1 = {(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)} and M>1 = {(1, 1)}. Consider a corresponding treatment
effect:
YM>j − YM≤j ,
where Y = 1[D ∈ M>j ]YM>j + 1[D ∈ M≤j ]YM≤j by (7.2). This quantity is the effect of
being treated with an equilibrium of at least j + 1 entrants relative to being treated with an
equilibrium of at most j entrants. We now establish that a version of the LATE monotonicity
assumption for this treatment 1[D ∈ M>j ] of dichotomous states is implied by the model
specification (2.2), using Theorem 3.1. Recall D(z) ≡ (D1(z1), ..., DS(zS)) where Ds(zs) is
the potential treatment.
19Alternatively, following the notation of Heckman et al. (2006), we can introduce a equilibrium selection
indicator DM,d that indicates that an equilibrium d is selected among equilibria in a set M :
DM,d =
{
1 if d ∈M is selected,
0 o.w.
Then, DM = d if and only if DM,d = 1.
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Lemma 7.1. Under Assumptions SS, SY1 and M1, the first-stage game (2.2) implies that,
for any z, z′ ∈ Z and j = 0, ..., S − 1,
Pr[D(z) ∈M≤j ,D(z′) ∈M>j ] = 0
or
Pr[D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ] = 0.
(7.3)
The condition (7.3) is a generalized version of Imbens and Angrist (1994)’s monotonicity
assumption.
Proof. For given z, z′ ∈ Z, suppose without loss of generality that in Assumption M1,
νsd−s(zs) ≥ νsd−s(z′s) ∀d−s and ∀s. Then by Theorem 3.1, it follows that R>j(z) ⊇ R>j(z′).
Then
Pr[D(z) ∈M≤j ,D(z′) ∈M>j ] = Pr[U ∈ R≤j(z) ∩R>j(z′)] = 0.
Lemma 7.1 allows us to give the IV estimand a LATE interpretation in our model:
Theorem 7.1. Given model (2.1)–(2.2), suppose Assumptions SS, SY1, M1, IN and EX
hold. Then it satisfies that, for any j = 0, ..., S − 1,
h(z, z′)
pM>j (z)− pM>j (z′)
=
E[Y |Z = z]− E[Y |Z = z′]
Pr[D ∈M>j |Z = z]− Pr[D ∈M>j |Z = z′]
= E[YM>j − YM≤j |D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ].
The LATE parameter E[YM>j − YM≤j |D(z) ∈ M>j ,D(z′) ∈ M≤j ] is the average of
treatment effect YM>j−YM≤j for a subgroup of “markets” that are more competitive markets
(with at least j+1 entrants) when players face Z = z, but are less competitive markets (with
at most j entrants) when players face Z = z′. For concreteness, suppose S = 2, j = 1, Zs is
each airline’s cost shifter and Y is the pollution level in a market. The LATE
E[Y{(1,1)} − Y{(1,0),(0,1),(0,0)}|D(z) = (1, 1),D(z′) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}]
is the effect of the existence of competition on pollution for markets that consist of “compli-
ers.”20 In other words, it is the average difference of potential pollution levels in a duopoly
market (i.e., duopolistic competition) and a monopoly or non-operating market (i.e., no com-
petition) for the subgroups of markets that form a duopoly when companies are facing low
cost (Z = z) but form a monopoly or do not operate when facing high cost (Z = z′).
Figure 9 depicts this subgroup of markets. In this example, the LATE monotonicity as-
sumption (implied by the entry game of strategic substitutes with symmetric payoffs) rules
out those markets that respond to cost shifters as “defiers.” The LATE becomes the ATE
20In this multi-agent multi-treatment scenario, compliers are defined as those players whose behaviors are
such that market structures are formed in conformance with the LATE monotonicity assumption (7.3). Unlike
in the traditional setting (Imbens and Angrist (1994)) where compliers are defined in terms of the subset of
population, the subpopulation in the present setting is the collection of the markets consist of the complying
players.
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when 1 = Pr[D(z) = (1, 1),D(z′) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}] = Pr[D = (1, 1)|Z = z] − Pr[D ∈
{(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}|Z = z′], which is related to the large-support argument in Theorem 6.1.
In general, the LATE can be defined with YM−YM ′ for any two partitioning setsM andM ′
of D (i.e., D = M∪M ′ with M∩M ′ = ∅) as long as 1[D(z) ∈M ] = 1−1[D(z) ∈M ′] satisfies
the LATE monotonicity assumption. Lemma 7.1 ensures that our simultaneous selection
model imposes this monotonicity for a particular partition, M = M>j and M ′ = M≤j . Also
the LATE using a more general function of the potential outcomes can be recovered analogous
to Abadie (2003): E[g(YM>j , X)− g(YM≤j , X)|D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ] for a measurable
function g(·) such that E |g(·)| <∞.
Remark 7.1. Similarly, it may be possible to recover the marginal treatment effect (MTE) of
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007). Given our setting, it should be a transition-specific
MTE for YMj −YMj−1. The identification of this MTE would require continuous variation of
Z. For discrete Z, the approach by Brinch et al. (2017) can be applied by imposing additional
structure on the MTE function.
Remark 7.2. The equilibrium selection mechanism may differ across different counterfac-
tuals. In terms of our notation, DM (z) may differ from DM (z
′), where DM (z) is the
counterfactual variable of DM . Note that not only the equilibrium being selected is different
but also the selection mechanism can be different. This feature may be emphasized by writing
DM (z) = λz(z,U) where the functional form of the equilibrium selection function may also
change in z. By considering YM instead of Yd, however, we can be agnostic about the selec-
tion mechanism, i.e., about the specification of λz(·, ·). The definition (7.1) asserts that Yd
can be meaningfully analyzed within the current framework only when the equilibrium being
selected is known.
8 Numerical Study
To illustrate the main results of this paper in a simulation exercise, we calculate the bounds
on the ATE using the following data generating process:
Yd = 1[µ˜d + βX ≥ ],
D1 = 1[δ2D2 + γ1Z1 ≥ V1],
D2 = 1[δ1D1 + γ2Z2 ≥ V2],
where (, V1, V2) are drawn, independent of (X,Z), from a joint normal distribution with
zero means and each correlation coefficient being 0.5. We draw Zs (s = 1, 2) and X from a
multinomial distribution, allowing Zs to take two values, Zs = {−1, 1} and X to take either
three values, X = {−1, 0, 1}, or fifteen values, X = {−1,−67 ,−57 , ..., 57 , 67 , 1}. Being consistent
with Assumptions M and SY, we choose µ˜11 > µ˜10 = µ˜01 > µ˜00, and with Assumption SS,
we choose δ1 < 0 and δ2 < 0. Without loss of generality, we choose positives values for γ1,
γ2, and β. Specifically, µ˜11 = 0.25, µ˜10 = µ˜01 = 0 and µ˜00 = −0.25. For default values,
δ1 = δ2 ≡ δ = −0.1, γ1 = γ2 ≡ γ = 1 and β = 0.5.
In this exercise, we focus on the ATE E[Y11−Y00|X = 0] whose true value is 0.2 given our
choice of parameter values. For h(z, z′, x), we consider z = (1, 1) and z′ = (−1,−1). Note
that H(x) = h(z, z′, x) and H(x, x′, x′′) = h(z, z′;x, x′, x′′) since Zs is binary. Then, we can
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derive the sets XUd (0;d′) and XLd (0;d′) for each d ∈ {(1, 1), (0, 0)} and d′ 6= d in Theorem
4.2.
Based on our design, H(0) > 0 and thus the bounds when we use Z only are, with x = 0,
max
z∈Z
Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 0)|z, x] ≤ Pr[Y00 = 1|x] ≤ min
z∈Z
Pr[Y = 1|z, x],
and
max
z∈Z
Pr[Y = 1|z, x] ≤ Pr[Y11 = 1|x] ≤ min
z∈Z
{Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 1)|z, x] + 1− Pr[D = (1, 1)|z, x]} .
Using both Z and X, we obtain narrower bounds. For example when |X | = 3, with
H(0,−1,−1) < 0, the lower bound on Pr[Y00 = 1|X = 0] becomes
max
z∈Z
{Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 0)|z, 0] + Pr[Y = 1,D ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}|z,−1]} .
With H(1, 1, 0) < 0, the upper bound on Pr[Y11 = 1|X = 0] becomes
min
z∈Z
{Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 1)|z, 0] + Pr[Y = 1,D ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}|z, 1] + Pr[D = (0, 0)|z, 0]} .
For comparison, we calculate the bounds in Manski (1990) using Z. These bounds are given
by
max
z∈Z
Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 0)|z, x] ≤ Pr[Y00 = 1|x]
≤ min
z∈Z
{Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 0)|z, x] + 1− Pr[D = (0, 0)|z]} ,
and
max
z∈Z
Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 1)|z, x] ≤ Pr[Y11 = 1|x]
≤ min
z∈Z
{Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 1)|z, x] + 1− Pr[D = (1, 1)|z]} .
We also compare the estimated ATE using a standard linear IV model where the nonlinearity
of the true DGP are ignored:
Y = pi0 + pi1D1 + pi2D2 + βX + ,(
D1
D2
)
=
(
γ10
γ20
)
+
(
γ11 γ12
γ21 γ22
)(
Z1
Z2
)
+
(
V1
V2
)
.
Here, the first stage is the reduced-form representation of the linear simultaneous equations
model for strategic interaction. Under this specification, the ATE becomes E[Y11 − Y00|X =
0] = pi1 + pi2, which is estimated via two-stage least squares (TSLS).
The bounds calculated for the ATE are shown in Figures 10–13. Figure 10 shows how
the bounds on the ATE change as the value of γ changes from 0 to 2.5. The larger γ is,
the stronger the instrument Z is. The first conspicuous result is that the TSLS estimate of
the ATE is biased due the problem of misspecification. Next, as expected, Manski’s bounds
and our proposed bounds converge to the true value of the ATE as the instrument becomes
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stronger. Overall, our bounds, with or without exploiting the variation of X, are much
narrower than Manski’s bounds.21 Notice that the sign of the ATE is identified in the whole
range of γ as predicted by the first part of Theorem 4.2, in contrast to Manski’s bounds.
By using the additional variation in X with |X | = 3, the width of the bounds is decreased,
particularly with the smaller upper bounds on the ATE in this simulation design. Figure 11
depicts the bounds using X with |X | = 15, which yields narrower bounds than when |X | = 3
and substantially narrower than those only using Z.
Figure 12 shows how the bounds change as the value of β changes from 0 to 1.5, where a
larger β corresponds to a stronger exogenous variable X. The jumps in the upper bound are
associated with the sudden changes in the signs of H(−1, 0,−1) and H(0, 1, 1). At least in
this simulation design, the strength of X is not a crucial factor to obtain narrower bounds.
In fact, based other simulation results (which are omitted in the paper), we conclude that
the number of values X can take matters more than the dispersion of X (unless we pursue
point identification of the ATE).
Finally, Figure 13 shows how the width of the bounds is related to the extent to which
the opponents’ actions D−s affect one’s payoff, captured by δ. We vary the value of δ from
−2 to 0, and when δ = 0, the players solve a single-agent optimization problem. Thus,
heuristically, the bound at this point would be similar to the ones that can be obtained when
Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) is extended to a multiple-treatment setting with no simultaneity.
In the figure, as the value of δ gets smaller, the bounds get narrower.
9 Empirical Application: Airline Markets and Pollution
Aircrafts are a major source of emissions and, thus, quantifying the causal effect of air
transport on pollution is of importance to policy makers. To this end, in this section, we
take the bounds proposed in Section 4 to data on airline market structure and air pollution
in cities in the U.S.
In 2013, aircrafts were responsible for about 3 percent of total U.S. carbon dioxide emis-
sions and nearly 9 percent of carbon dioxide emissions from the U.S. transportation sector,
and it is one of the fastest growing sources.22 Airplanes remain the single largest source
of carbon dioxide emissions within the U.S. transportation sector that is not yet subject to
greenhouse gas regulations. In addition to aircrafts, airport land operations are also a big
source of pollution, making airports one of the major sources of air pollution in the U.S. Just
as an example, 43 of the 50 largest airports are in ozone nonattainment areas and 12 are in
particulate matter nonattainment areas.23
There is a growing literature showing the effects of air pollution on various health out-
comes (see, e.g., Schlenker and Walker (2015), Chay and Greenstone (2003), Knittel et al.
(2011)). In particular, Schlenker and Walker (2015) show that the causal effect of airport
pollution on the health of local residents—using a clever instrumental variable approach—is
21Although we do not make a rigorous comparison of the assumptions here, note that the bounds by Manski
and Pepper (2000) under the semi-MTR is expected to be similar to ours. Their bounds, however, need to
assume the direction of the monotonicity.
22See https://www.c2es.org/content/reducing-carbon-dioxide-emissions-from-aircraft/7/
23Ozone is not emitted directly but is formed when nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons react in the atmosphere
in the presence of sunlight. In United States environmental law, a non-attainment area is an area considered
to have air quality worse than the National Ambient Air Quality Standards as defined in the Clean Air Act.
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sizable. Their study focuses on the 12 major airports in California and implicitly assume
that the level of competition (or market structure) is fixed. Using high-frequency data, they
exploit weather shocks in the East coast—that might affect airport activity in California
through network effects—to quantify the effect of airport pollution on respiratory and car-
diovascular health complications. In contrast, we take the link between airport pollution
and health outcomes as given and are interested in quantifying the effects on air pollution
of different market structures of the airline industry.24 We explicitly allow market structure
to be determined endogenously as the outcome of an entry game in which airlines behave
strategically to maximize their profits and the resulting pollution is this market is not inter-
nalized by the firms. Understanding these effects can then help inform the policy discussion
on pollution regulation. Given that we treat market structure as endogenous, it should be
clear that one cannot simply run a regression of a measure of pollution on market structure
(or the number of airlines present in a market) to get at the causal effect if there are un-
observed market characteristics that affect both firm competition and pollution outcomes.
Instead, we use the method presented in Section 4.
In each market, we assume that a set of airlines chooses to be in or out as part of a
simultaneous entry game of perfect information as introduced in Section 2. Therefore, we
treat market structure as our endogenous treatment. We then model air pollution as a
function of the airline market structure as in equation (2.1), where Y is a measure of air
pollution at the airport level (hence including both aircraft and land operation pollution),
the vector D represents the market structure, and X includes market specific covariates that
affect pollution directly (i.e., not through airline activity) such as weather shocks or the
share of pollution-related activity in the local economy. Additionally, we allow for market-
level covariates, W , that affect both the participation decisions and pollution (e.g., the size
of the market as measured by population or the level of economic activity). As instruments,
Zs, we consider a firm-market proxy for cost introduced in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). We
discuss the definition and construction of the variables in detail below.
Our objective is to estimate the effect on air pollution of a change in market structure,
E[Yd−Yd′ ]. For example, we might be interested in the average effect on pollution of moving
from two airlines operating in the market to three, or how the pollution level changes on
average when Delta is a monopolist versus a situation in which Delta faces competition from
American. In particular, to illustrate our estimation procedure we consider three types of
ATE exercises. The first one looks at the effects on pollution from a monopolist airline vis-
a-vis a market that is not served by any airline. The second set of exercises look at the total
effect of the industry on pollution under all possible market configurations. Finally, the third
type of exercises look at how the (marginal) effect of a given airline changes when the firm
faces different levels of competition. Notice that, regardless of the exercise we run, what
we quantify are “reduced-form” effects in the sense that they summarize structural effects
that result from a given market structure. The idea is that, given the market structure,
prices are determined and, given demand, ultimately the frequency of flights in the market
is determined which is what, in fact, causes pollution.
In the rest of this section, we first describe our data sources, then show results for three
24In this section we refer to market structure as the particular configuration of airlines present in the market.
In other words, market structure not only refers to the number of firms competing in a given market but to
the actual identities of the firms. Thus, we will regard a market in which, say, United and American operate
as different from a market in which Southwest and Delta operate despite both markets having two carriers.
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different ATE exercises, and conclude with a brief discussion relating our results to potential
policy recommendations.
9.1 Data
For our analysis we combine data spanning the period 2000–2015 from two sources: airline
data from the U.S. Department of Transportation and pollution data from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
Airline Data. Our first data source contains airline information and combines pub-
licly available data from the Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey
(DB1B) and Domestic Segment (T-100) database. These datasets have been used extensively
in the literature to analyze the airline industry (see, e.g., Borenstein (1989), Berry (1992),
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), and more recently, Roberts and Sweeting (2016) and Ciliberto
et al. (2013)). The DB1B database is a quarterly sample of all passenger domestic itineraries.
The dataset contains coupon-specific information, including origin and destination airports,
number of coupons, the corresponding operating carriers, number of passengers, prorated
market fare, market miles flown, and distance. The T-100 dataset is a monthly census of all
domestic flights broken down by airline and origin and destination airports.
Our time-unit of analysis is a quarter and we define a market as the market for air con-
nection between a pair of two airports (regardless of intermediate stops) in a given quarter.25
We restrict the sample to include the top 100 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s), ranked
by population at the beginning of our sample period. We follow Berry (1992) and Ciliberto
and Tamer (2009) and define an airline as actively serving a market in a given quarter if we
observe at least 90 passengers in the DB1B survey flying with the airline in the corresponding
quarter.26 We exclude from our sample city pairs in which no airline operates in the whole
sample period. Notice that we do include markets that are temporarily not served by any
airline. This leaves as with 181,095 market-quarter observations.
In our analysis we allow for airlines to have a heterogeneous effect on pollution and, to
simplify computation, in each market we allow for six potential participants: American (AA),
Delta (DL), United (UA), Southwest (WN), a medium-size airline, and a low-cost carrier.27
The latter is not a bad approximation to the data in the sense that we rarely observe more
that one medium-size or low-cost in a market but it assumes that all low-cost airlines have
the same strategic behavior, and so do the medium airlines. Table 2 shows the number of
firms in each market where we break down markets by their size as measured by population.
As we can see from the table, market size alone does not explain market structure, a point
that was first made by Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
In our application we consider two instruments for the entry decisions. The first one is
the airport presence of an airline proposed by Berry (1992). For a given airline, this variable
is constructed as the number of markets served by it out of an airport as a fraction of the
total number of markets served by all airlines out of the airport. A hub-and-spoke network
25In cities that operate more than one airport, we assume that flights to different airports in the same
metropolitan area are in separate markets.
26This corresponds to approximately the number of passengers that would be carried on a medium-size jet
operating once a week.
27That is, to limit the number of potential market structures, we lump together all the low cost carriers into
one category and Northwest, Continental, America West, and USAir under the medium airline type.
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Table 2: Distribution of the Number of Carriers by Market Size
Market size
# firms Large Medium Small Total
0 7.96 8.20 8.62 8.18
1 41.18 22.53 20.58 30.30
2 28.14 23.41 21.25 25.04
3 12.65 20.00 16.67 16.05
4 7.65 14.72 15.17 11.51
5 1.98 9.90 16.48 7.80
6+ 0.52 1.23 2.21 1.12
# markets 79,326 64,191 37,578 181,095
Table 3: Airline Summary Statistics
American Delta United Southwest medium low-cost
Market presence (0/1) mean 0.44 0.57 0.28 0.25 0.56 0.17
sd 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.51 0.38
Airport presence (%) mean 0.43 0.56 0.27 0.25 0.39 0.10
sd 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.08
Cost (%) mean 0.71 0.41 0.76 0.29 0.22 0.04
sd 1.56 1.28 1.43 0.83 0.60 0.17
allow firms to exploit demand-side and cost-side economies which should affect the firm’s
profitability. While Berry (1992) assumes that an airline’s airport presence only affects own
profits (and hence is excluded from rivals’ profits), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) argue that
that may not be the case in practice since airport presence might be a measure of product
differentiation rendering it likely to enter the demand size of the profit function of all firms.
While an instrument that enters all of the profit functions is fine in our context (see Appendix
C), we also consider the instrument proposed by Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), which captures
shocks to the fixed cost of providing a service in a market. This variable, which they called
cost, is constructed as the percentage of the nonstop distance that the airline must travel in
excess of the nonstop distance if the airline uses a connecting instead of a nonstop flight.28
Arguably, this variable only affects own profits and is excluded from rivals’ profits.
Table 3 shows summary statistics of the airline related variables. Of the leading airlines,
we see that American and Delta are present in about half of the markets, while United and
Southwest are only present in about a quarter of the markets. American and Delta tend to
dominate the airports in which they operate more than United and Southwest. From the cost
variable we see that both American and United tend to operate a hub-and-spoke network
while Southwest (and to a lesser extent Delta) operates most markets in a nonstop fashion.
Pollution Data. The second component of our dataset is the air pollution data. The
28Mechanically, the variable is constructed as the difference between the sum of the distances of a market’s
endpoints and the closest hub of an airline, and the nonstop distance between the endpoints, divided by the
nonstop distance.
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Table 4: Market-level Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Pollution
Ozone (O3) .0477 .0056
Particulate matter (PM2.5) 8.3881 2.5287
Other controls
Market size (pop.) 2307187.8 1925533.4
Income (per capita) 34281.6 4185.5
# of markets 181,095
EPA compiles a database of outdoor concentrations of pollutants measured at more than 4,000
monitoring stations throughout the U.S. owned and operated mainly by state environmental
agencies. Each monitoring station is geocoded and hence we are able to merge these data
with the airline dataset by matching all the monitoring stations that are located within a
10km radius of each airport in our first dataset.
The principal emissions of aircraft include the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO2) and
water vapor (H2O) that have a direct impact on climate change. But aircraft jet engines also
produce nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) (which together are termed nitrogen
oxides (NOx)), carbon monoxide (CO), oxides of sulphur (SOx), unburned or partially com-
busted hydrocarbons (also known as volatile organic compounds, or VOC’s), particulates,
and other trace compounds (see, e.g, Federal Aviation Administration (2015)). In addition,
ozone (O3) is formed by the reaction of VOC’s and NOx in the presence of heat and sunlight.
The set of pollutants other than CO2 are more pernicious in the sense that they can harm
human health directly and can result in respiratory, cardiovascular, and neurological condi-
tions. Research to date indicates that fine particulate matter (PM) is responsible for the
majority of the health risks from aviation emissions, although ozone also has a substantial
health impact too.29 Therefore, as our measure of pollution we consider both.
Our measure of ozone is a quarterly mean of daily maximum levels in parts per million.
In terms of PM, as a general rule, the smaller the particle the further it travels in the
atmosphere, the longer it remains suspended in the atmosphere, and the more risk it poses
to human health. PM that measure less than 2.5 micrometer can be readily inhaled and thus
potentially pose increased health risks. The variable PM2.5 is a quarterly average of daily
averages and is measured in micrograms/cubic meter. For each airport in our sample, we
take an average (weighted by distance to the airport) of the data from all air monitoring
stations within a 10km radius. The top panel of Table 4 shows summary statistics of the
pollution measures.
Other Market-Level Controls. We also include in our analysis market-level covariates
that may affect both market structure and pollution levels. In particular, we construct a
measure of market size by computing the (geometric) mean of the MSA populations at the
market endpoints and a measure of economic activity by computing the average per capita
income at the market endpoints using data from the Regional Economic Accounts of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
29See Federal Aviation Administration (2015).
37
Finally, as we mentioned in Section 4, having access to data on a variable that affects pol-
lution but is excluded from the airline participation decisions can greatly help in calculating
the bounds of the ATE. We therefore construct a variable that measures the economic activity
of pollution related industries (manufacturing, construction, and transportation other than
air transportation) in a given market (MSA) as a fraction of total economic activity in that
market, again, using data from the Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The idea of this variable is that, conditional on the market GDP, a market with a
higher share of polluting industries will have a higher level of pollution but this share would
not affect the airline market structure.
9.2 Estimation and Results
To simplify the estimation, in what follows we discretize all continuous variables into binary
variables (taking a value of 0 (1) if the corresponding continuous variable is below (above)
its median). Using the notation from Section 2, let the elements of the treatment vector
d = (dDL, dAA, dUA, dWN, dmed, dlow) be either 0 or 1, indicating whether each firm is active
in the market. We compute the upper and lower bounds on the ATE using the result from
Theorem 4.2 and the fact that our Y variable is binary. Specifically, given two treatment
vectors d and d˜ we can bound the ATE
L(x,w) ≤ E[Yd − Yd˜|X = x,W = w] ≤ U(x,w)
where upper bound can be characterized by
U(x,w) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D = d|Z = z, X = x,W = w]
+
∑
d′ 6=d
Pr[Y = 1,D = d′|Z = z, X = x′(d′),W = w]
− Pr[Y = 1,D = d˜|Z = z, X = x,W = w]
−
∑
d′′ 6=d˜
Pr[Y = 1,D = d′′|Z = z, X = x′′(d′′),W = w]
for every z, x′(d′) ∈ XUd (x;d′) for d′ 6= d, and x′′(d′′) ∈ XLd˜ (x;d′′) for d′′ 6= d˜. Similarly, the
lower bound can be characterized by
L(x,w) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D = d|Z = z, X = x,W = w]
+
∑
d′ 6=d
Pr[Y = 1,D = d′|Z = z, X = x′(d′),W = w]
− Pr[Y = 1,D = d˜|Z = z, X = x,W = w]
−
∑
d′′ 6=d˜
Pr[Y = 1,D = d′′|Z = z, X = x′′(d′′),W = w]
for every z, x′(d′) ∈ XLd (x;d′) for d′ 6= d, and x′′(d′′) ∈ XLd˜ (x;d′′) for d′′ 6= d˜. We estimate
the population objects above using their sample counterparts. We experimented with both
measures of pollution discussed earlier and obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar
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Figure 4: The Effect of a Monopolistic Market Structure
This plot shows the ATE’s of a change in market structure from no airline serving a market to a
monopolist serving it. The solid black intervals are our estimates of the identified sets and the thin
red lines are the 95% confidence sets.
results in all cases which is not surprising given that the two pollution measure are highly
correlated. In what follows, in order to save space, we only show results using PM2.5 as
our outcome variable. We also experimented with several specifications of the covariates, X
and W , and instruments, Z. In particular, we tried different discretizations of each variable
(including allowing for more than two points in their supports and different cutoffs). Clearly,
there is a limit to how finely we can cut the data even with a large sample size like ours. The
coarser discretization occurs when each covariate (and instrument) is binary and it seems to
produce reasonable results hence in all of our exercises with stick with this discretization.
Again, aiming at the most parsimonious model, and after some experimentation, we found
that we obtain reasonable results when both X and W are scalars (share of pollution related
industries in the market and total GDP in the market, respectively).
We also compute confidence sets by deriving unconditional moment inequalities from our
conditional moment inequalities above and implementing the Generalized Moment Selection
test proposed by Andrews and Soares (2010). The confidence sets are obtained by inverting
the test.30
Monopoly Effects. Here we look at a very simple ATE of a change in market structure
from no airline serving a market to a monopolist serving it. Intuitively, we want to learn
what is the change in the probability of being a high-pollution market when an airline starts
operating on it. Recall that we allow each firm to have different effects on pollution, hence
30For details of this procedure see Dickstein and Morales (2016).
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Figure 5: Total Market Structure Effect
This plot shows the ATE’s of airline industry as a whole under all possible market configurations. The
solid black intervals are our estimates of the identified sets and the thin red lines are the 95% confidence
sets. The bars in each cluster correspond to all possible market configurations, respectively.
we estimate the effects of each one of the six firms in our data becoming a monopolist. Thus,
we are interested in the ATE’s of the form
E[Ydmonop − Ydnoserv |X,W ]
where dmonop is one of the six vectors in which only one element is 1 and the rest are 0’s,
and dnoserv is a vector of all 0’s. The results are shown in Figure 4, where the solid black
intervals are our estimates of the identified sets and the thin red lines are the 95% confidence
sets. We see that all ATE’s are positive and statistically significant different from 0. While
there no major differences on the effects of the leader carriers, with the exception of Delta
which seems to induce a higher increase in the probability of high pollution, the medium and
low-cost carriers induce a smaller effect.
Total Market Structure Effect. We now turn to our second set of exercises. Here
we quantify the effect of the airline industry as a whole on the likelihood of a market having
high levels of pollution. To do so, we estimate ATE’s of the form
E[Yd − Ydnoserv |X,W ]
for all potential market configurations d and where, as before, dnoserv is a vector of all 0’s.
Figure 5 depicts the results. The left-most set of intervals corresponds to the 6 different
40
Figure 6: The Marginal Effect of Delta under Different Market Structures
This plot shows the ATE’s of Delta entering the market given all possible rivals marker configurations.
The solid black intervals are our estimates of the identified sets and the thin red lines are the 95%
confidence sets. The bars in each cluster correspond to all possible market configurations, respectively.
monopolistic market structures and, by construction, coincide with those from Figure 4.
The next set corresponds to all possible duopolistic structures which has 15 possibilities,
and so on. Not surprisingly, we observe that the effect on the probability of being a high-
pollution market is increasing in the number of firms operating in the market. What is more
interesting is the non-linearity of the effect: the effect increases at a decreasing rate. This
would be consistent with a model in which firms accommodate new entrants by decreasing
their frequency, which is analogous to the prediction of a Cournot competition model as we
increase the number of firms. To further investigate this point, in the next set of exercises
we look at the effect of one firm as we change the competition it faces.
Marginal Carrier Effect. In our last set of exercises we are interested in investigating
how the marginal effect (i.e., the effect of introducing one more firm into the market) changes
under different configurations of the market structure. Say we are interested in the effect of
Delta entering the market on pollution given that the current market structure (excluding
Delta) is d–DL = (dAA, dUA, dWN, dmed, dlow). Then, we want to estimate
E[Y(1,d–DL) − Y(0,d–DL)|X,W ].
Figure 6 shows the identified sets and confidence sets of the marginal effect of Delta on
the probability of high pollution under all possible market configuration for Delta’s rivals.
We obtain qualitatively similar results when we estimate the marginal effects of the other five
carriers and, hence, we omit the graphs to save space. In the Figure, the left-most exercise is
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the effect of Delta as a monopolist and coincides, by construction, with the left-most exercise
in Figure 4. The second exercise (from the left) corresponds to the additional effect of Delta
on pollution when there is already one firm operating in the market, which yields five different
possibilities. The next exercise shows the effect of Delta when there are two firms already
operating in the market yielding 10 possibilities, and so on. Again, the estimated marginal
ATE’s in all cases are positive and statistically significant. Interestingly, although we cannot
entirely reject the null hypothesis that all the effects are the same, it seems that the marginal
effect of Delta is decreasing in the number of rivals it faces. Intuitively, this suggests a
situation in which Delta enters the market and operates with a frequency that is decreasing
with the number of rivals (again, as we would expect in a Cournot competition model) and
is consistent with the findings in our previous set of exercises.
The conclusions from the total market and marginal ATE’s are also interesting from a
policy perspective. A merger of two airlines, for example, in which duplicate routes are
eliminated would imply a decrease in total pollution in the affected markets, but by less than
what one would have naively anticipated from removing one airline while keeping everything
else constant. In other words, there are two effects that come as a result from removing an
airline in a market. The first is a direct affect: pollution decreases by the amount of what
the carrier that is no longer present in the market was polluting. But the remaining firms
in the market will react strategically to the new market structure. In our exercises, we find
that this indirect effect implies an increase in pollution. The overall effect is a net decrease
in pollution. Moreover, given the non-linearities of the ATE’s we estimate it looks like the
overall effect, while negative, might be negligible in markets with four or more competitors.
While it is not clear that merger analysis, which is typically concerned with price increases
post-merge or cost savings of the merging firms, should also consider externalities such as
pollution, (social) welfare analysis should. Hence, our findings may serve as a guidance to
the policy discussion of air traffic regulation.
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A Partial ATE
Define a partial counterfactual outcome as follows: with a partition D = (D1,D2) ∈ D1 ×
D2 = D and its realization d = (d1,d2),
Yd1,D2 ≡
∑
d2∈D2
1[D2 = d2]Yd1,d2 . (A.1)
This is a counterfactual outcome that is fully observed once D1 = d1 is realized. Then for
each d1 ∈ D1, the partial ASF can be defined as
E[Yd1,D2 ] =
∑
d2∈D2
E[Yd1,d2 |D2 = d2] Pr[D2 = d2] (A.2)
and the partial ATE between d and d′ as
E[Yd1,D2 − Yd1′,D2 ]. (A.3)
Using this concept, we can consider complementarity concentrated on, e.g., the first two
treatments: E
[
Y11,D2 − Y01,D2
]
> E
[
Y10,D2 − Y00,D2
]
.
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B More Examples
Example 3 (Incumbents’ response to potential entrants). In this example, we are interested
in how market i’s incumbents respond to the threat of entry of potential competitors. Let
Yi be an incumbent firm’s pricing or investment decision and Ds,i be an entry decision by
firm s in “nearby” markets, which can be formally defined in each context. For example, in
airline entry, nearby markets are defined as city pairs that share the endpoints with the city
pair of an incumbent (Goolsbee and Syverson (2008)). That is, potential entrants are airlines
that operate in one (or both) of the endpoints of the incumbent’s market i, but who have
not connected these endpoints. Then the parameter E[Yd,i − Yd′,i] captures the incumbent’s
response to the threat, specifically whether it responds by lowering the price or making an
investment. As in Example 1, Zs,i are cost shifters and Xi are other factors affecting price
of the incumbent, excluded from nearby markets, conditional of Wi. The characteristics of
the incumbent’s market can be a candidate of Xi, such as the distance between the endpoints
of the incumbent’s market in the airline example.
Example 4 (Food desert). Let Yi denote a health outcome, such as diabetes prevalence, in
region i, and Ds,i be the exit decision by large supermarket s in the region. Then E[Yd,i−Yd′,i]
measures the effects of absence of supermarkets on health of the residents. Conditional on
other factors Wi, the instrument Zs,i can include changes in local government’s zoning plans
and Xi can include the region’s health-related variables, such as the number of hospitals and
the obesity rate. This problem is related to the literature on “food desert” (e.g., Walker et al.
(2010)).
Example 5 (Ground water and agriculture). In this example, we are interested in the im-
pact of access to groundwater on economic outcomes in rural areas (Foster and Rosenzweig
(2008)). In each Indian village i, symmetric wealthy farmers (of the same caste) make irri-
gation decisions Ds,i, i.e., whether or not to buy motor pumps, in the presence of peer effects
and learning spillovers. Since ground water is a limited resource that is seasonally recharged
and depleted, other farmers’ entry may negatively affects one’s payoff. The adoption of the
technology affects Yi, which can be the average of local wages of peasants or prices of agri-
cultural products, or a village development or poverty level. In this example, continuous or
binary instrument Zs,i can be the depth to groundwater, which is exogenously given (Sekhri
(2014)), or provision of electricity for pumping in a randomized field experiment. Xi can be
village-level characteristics that villagers do not know ex ante or do not concern about.31
C Model with Common Z
Consider model (2.1)–(2.2) but with instruments common to all players/treatments, i.e.,
Z1 = · · · = ZS :
Y = θ(D, X, D),
Ds = 1 [ν
s(D−s, Z1) ≥ Us] , s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
31Especially in this example, the number of players/treatments Si is allowed to vary across villages. We
assume in this case that players/treatments are symmetric (in a sense that becomes clear later) and ν1(·) =
· · · = νSi(·) = ν(·).
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This setting can be motivated by such instruments as appeared in Example 2. Given this
model, Assumptions SS, SY1, M1, IN, EX and C will be understood with Z1 = · · · = ZS
imposed.32 Then the bound analysis for the ATE including sharpness as well as the LATE
result will naturally follow. The intuition of this straightforward extension is as follows. As a
generalized version of monotonicity in the treatment selection process is restored (Theorem
3.1), model (2.1)–(2.2) can essentially be seen as a triangular model with an ordered-choice
type of a first-stage. Therefore an instrument that “shift” the entire first-stage process
is sufficient for the purpose of our analyses. Player-specific instruments do introduce an
additional source of variation, as it is crucial for the point identification of the ATE that
employs identification at infinity.
D Proofs
D.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The following proposition is useful in proving Proposition 3.1:
Proposition D.1. Let R and Q be sets defined by Cartesian products: R =
∏S
s=1 rs and
Q =
∏S
s=1 qs where rs and qs are intervals in R. Then the following holds:
(i) If rs ∩ qs = ∅ for some s, then R ∩Q = ∅;
(ii) If rs ∼ qs ∀s, then R ∼ Q;
(iii) If rs  qs for some s, then R  Q;
(iv) R ∩Q = ∏Ss=1 rs ∩ qs;
(v) cl(R) =
∏S
s=1 cl(rs) where cl(·) is the closure of its argument.
The proof of this proposition follows directly from the definition of R and Q. To utilize
Proposition D.1, we show that Proposition 3.1(i)–(iii) are implied by similar statements that
satisfy for all individual pairs between two regions: (i′) Rdj ∩ Rdj′ = ∅ ∀dj ∈ Mj and
∀dj′ ∈Mj′ with j 6= j′; (ii′) Rdj and Rdj−1 are neighboring sets ∀dj ∈Mj and ∀dj−1 ∈Mj−1;
(iii′) Rdj and Rdj−t are not neighboring sets ∀dj ∈Mj and ∀dj−t ∈Mj−t with t ≥ 2.
Before proving Proposition 3.1(i), we prove (i′). We first show a simple case as a reference:
Rej ∩Rej−1 = ∅ for j = 1, ..., S. Note that
Rej (z) =
{
j∏
s=1
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]}×

S∏
s=j+1
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
Rej−1(z) =
{
j−1∏
s=1
(
0, νsj−2(zs)
]}×

S∏
s=j
(
νsj−1(zs), 1
]
and the j-th coordinates are
(
0, νjj−1(zj)
]
in Rej and
(
νjj−1(zj), 1
]
in Rej−1 . Since these two
intervals are disjoint, by Proposition D.1(i), we can conclude that Rej ∩ Rej−1 = ∅. Now to
prove (i′), we equivalently prove Rdj ∩ Rdj−t = ∅ for t ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ j − t ≤ S − t, and draw
insights from the simple case. Note that dj−t contains S − j + t zeros. Then there exists
32Assumption ASY may be slightly harder to justify with a common instrument.
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s∗ such that djs∗ = 1 but d
j−t
s∗ = 0, i.e., Us∗ ∈
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
in Rdj but Us∗ ∈
(
νs
∗
j−t(zs∗), 1
]
in Rdj−t . Suppose not. Then ∀s such that djs = 1, it must hold that dj−ts = 1. This
implies that dj−t has at least as many elements of unity as dj , which is contradiction as
t ≥ 1. Therefore since
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
and
(
νs
∗
j−t(zs∗), 1
]
are disjoint, Rdj and Rdj−t are
disjoint. When t ≥ 2, by Assumption SS, νs∗j−t(zs∗) > νs
∗
j−1(zs∗) and therefore
(
νs
∗
j−t(zs∗), 1
]
and
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
are disjoint and thus the same conclusion follows. Also when t = 1,(
νs
∗
j−1(zs∗), 1
]
and
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
are obviously disjoint. This proves (i′).
For Proposition 3.1(i), one can conclude from (i′) that Rdj is disjoint to Rdj′ for any
dj
′ ∈Mj′ and hence is disjoint to
⋃
d∈Mj′ Rd. This is true ∀d
j ∈Mj , and therefore
⋃
d∈Mj Rd
is disjoint to
⋃
d∈Mj′ Rd.
To prove (ii′), by Proposition D.1(ii), one needs to show that each pair of intervals of
the same coordinate are neighboring intervals. This is immediately true for Rej and Rej−1
above, since (a) for coordinates 1 ≤ s ≤ j− 1,
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
∼
(
0, νsj−2(zs)
]
with a nonempty
intersection since
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
⊂
(
0, νsj−2(zs)
]
; (b) for coordinate s = j,
(
0, νjj−1(zj)
]
∼(
νjj−1(zj), 1
]
and they are disjoint; and (c) for coordinates j + 1 ≤ s ≤ S,
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
∼(
νsj−1(zs), 1
]
with a nonempty intersection since
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
⊃
(
νsj−1(zs), 1
]
. Now consider
Rdj and Rdj−1 . In d
j and dj−1, there exists s∗ such that djs∗ = 1 but d
j−1
s∗ = 0 by the same
argument as above with t = 1. The rest of the elements in dj and dj−1 fall into one of the
four types: for s 6= s∗, (a′) djs = dj−1s = 1; (b′) djs = 1 but dj−1s = 0; (c′) djs = dj−1s = 0;
and (d′) djs = 0 but dj−1s = 1. See Table 1 in the main text for an example of this result.
We aim to express the corresponding intervals of Us that generate these values of d
j
s and
dj−1s . By definition, the number of ones (and zeros) in dj and dj−1 differs only by one,
which happens in each vector’s s∗-th element. Knowing this, for these pairs of djs and dj−1s
in (a′)–(d′), we can determine the decision of the opponents of player s (i.e., the value of j
in νsj ) which is useful to construct the payoff of s, and thus the corresponding interval of Us.
Specifically, we can determine that the corresponding interval pairs are: (a′′)
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
and
(
0, νsj−2(zs)
]
; (b′′)
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
and
(
νsj−1(zs), 1
]
; (c′′)
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
and
(
νsj−1(zs), 1
]
; (d′′)(
νsj (zs), 1
]
and
(
0, νsj−2(zs)
]
. It is straightforward that the pairs in (a′′)–(c′′) are neighboring
sets by the same arguments as for (a)–(c). The pair in (d′′) are also neighboring sets because
νsj (zs) < ν
s
j−2(zs) by Assumption SS. Lastly, for coordinate s
∗,
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
∼
(
νs
∗
j−1(zs∗), 1
]
as in (b′′). Therefore, Rdj ∼ Rdj−1 .
For Proposition 3.1(ii), one can conclude from (ii′) that Rdj neighbors Rdj−1 for any
dj−1 ∈ Mj−1 and hence neighbors
⋃
d∈Mj−1 Rd. This is true ∀dj ∈ Mj , and therefore⋃
d∈Mj Rd ∼
⋃
d∈Mj′ Rd.
The result in Proposition 3.1(iii) follows from the proof of (i’) above that there exists s∗
such that djs∗ = 1 but d
j−t
s∗ = 0, i.e., Us∗ ∈
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
in Rdj but Us∗ ∈
(
νs
∗
j−t(zs∗), 1
]
in
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Rdj−t . When t ≥ 2, by Assumption SS, νs∗j−t(zs∗) > νs
∗
j−1(zs∗) and therefore
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
(
νs
∗
j−t(zs∗), 1
]
which implies that, by Proposition D.1(iii), their Cartesian products are not
neighboring sets.
Lastly, we prove Proposition 3.1(iv). We consider a S-dimensional hyper-grid for (0, 1]S
that runs through all possible values of νsj across j = 0, ..., S for each s = 1, ..., S. Specifically,
under Assumption SS and by conveniently letting νsS = 0 and ν
s−1 = 1, the hyper-grid is a
Cartesian product of 1-dimensional grids defined by 0 = νsS < ν
s
S−1 < · · · < νs0 < νs−1 = 1 for
each coordinate s. Let each hyper-cube in this hyper-grid be represented as
r1(j1)× r2(j2)× · · · × rS(jS) ≡
(
ν1j1 , ν
1
j1−1
]× (ν2j2 , ν2j2−1]× · · · × (νSjS , νSjS−1] ,
where rs(·) are intervals implicitly defined in the equation and labeled with js = 0, ..., S.
Using these notations, Rej for j = 0, ..., S can be expressed as
Rej =
U : (U1, ..., US) ∈

j∏
s=1
S⋃
k=j
rs(k)
×

S∏
s=j+1
j⋃
k=0
rs(k)


=
U : (U1, ..., US) ∈
S⋃
j1=j
· · ·
S⋃
jj=j
·
j⋃
jj+1=0
· · ·
j⋃
jS=0
r1(j1)× · · · × rS(jS)
 , (D.1)
where the second equality is by iteratively applying the following: for sets A, B and C being
Cartesian products (including intervals as a trivial case),
(A ∪B)× C = (A× C) ∪ (B × C).
More generally, R
djσ
for some σ(·) ∈ Σ can be defined as
R
djσ
=
U : (Uσ(1), ..., Uσ(S)) ∈
S⋃
j1=j
· · ·
S⋃
jj=j
·
j⋃
jj+1=0
· · ·
j⋃
jS=0
rσ(1)(j1)× · · · × rσ(S)(jS)
 .
(D.2)
Below we show that any hyper-cube r1(j1)× r2(j2)×· · ·× rS(jS) is contained in one of Rdjσ ’s
for some j and σ(·). We first proceed by showing that there are hyper-cubes that are con-
tained in Rej ’s. We then show that any hyper-cube can be transformed using a permutation
function into a hyper-cube contained in Rej , which means that the original hyper-cube is
contained in some Rdj which is a “permutated version” of Rej .
Claim 1: For j1 ≥ j2 ≥ · · · ≥ jS , r1(j1)× r2(j2)× · · · × rS(jS) is contained in Rej for some
j ≤ j1.
Claim 2: For any {j1, ..., jS}, r1(j1) × r2(j2) × · · · × rS(jS) is contained in Rdj for j ≤
max{j1, ..., jS}.
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Proof of Claim 1: Start with a hyper-cube at a corner:
r1(0)× r2(0)× · · · × rS(0) ≡
(
ν10 , 1
]× (ν20 , 1]× · · · × (νS0 , 1] .
This hyper-cube is contained in Re0 as the two in fact coincide. Consider the next hyper-cube
on the grid along the 1-st coordinate: r1(1)× r1(0) · · · × rS(0). This hyper-cube is contained
in Re1 as
Re1 =
S⋃
j1=1
·
1⋃
j2=0
· · ·
1⋃
jS=0
r1(j1)× · · · × rS(jS).
We move to the 2-nd coordinate holding the 1-st coordinate fixed. Then r1(1)×r2(1)×r3(0)×
· · · × rS(0) is still contained in Re1 . Likewise, from r1(1)× r2(1)× r3(1)× r4(0)× · · · × rS(0)
all the way to r1(1)× · · · × rS(1), these hyper-cubes are contained in Re1 .
Now consider the next hyper-cube along the 1-st coordinate, i.e., r1(2)×r2(0)×· · ·×rS(0).
This is contained in Re1 . We move to the next coordinates holding the 1-st coordinate
fixed. Then r1(2)× r2(1)× r3(0)× · · · × rS(0), r1(2)× r2(1)× r3(1)× r4(0)× · · · × rS(0) to
r1(2)×r1(1)×· · ·×rS(1) are still contained inRe1 . But the next r1(2)×r2(2)×r3(0)×· · ·×rS(0)
is no longer contained in Re1 but is contained in
Re2 =
S⋃
j1=2
·
S⋃
j2=2
·
2⋃
j3=0
· · ·
2⋃
jS=0
r1(j1)× r2(j2)× · · · × rS(jS).
Likewise, following the same sequential rule, r1(2) × r2(2) × r3(1) × r4(0) × · · · × rS(0),
r1(2)×r2(2)×r3(1)×r4(1)×r5(0)×· · ·×rS(0) to r1(2)×· · ·×rS(2) are all contained in Re2 .
This argument can iteratively be applied to all other hyper-cubes r1(j1)×r2(j2)×· · ·×rS(jS)
generated by the same sequential rule maintaining j1 ≥ j2 ≥ · · · ≥ jS . This proves Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 2: In general, consider r1(j1)×· · ·×rS(jS) for given j1, ..., jS . There exists
permutation σ(·) and a sequence {ks}Ss=1 such that js = kσ(s) and k1 ≥ k2 ≥ · · · ≥ kS . Then
a hyper-cube
rσ(1)(j1)× · · · × rσ(S)(jS) = rσ(1)(kσ(1))× · · · × rσ(S)(kσ(S))
in the space of (Uσ(1), ..., Uσ(S)), or equivalently r1(k1)×· · ·×rS(kS) in the space of (U1, ..., US),
satisfies the condition in Claim 1 and thus is contained in Rej for some j ≤ kS by Claim
1. Let σ−1(·) be the inverse of σ(·). Note that σ−1(·) itself is a permutation function. In
general, for permutation σ˜(·), if r1(k1) × · · · × rS(kS) is contained in Rej for some j, then
rσ˜(1)(k1)× · · · × rσ˜(S)(kS) is contained in Rdjσ˜ by definition. Therefore, since rσ−1(σ(s))(js) =
rs(js) ∀s, we can conclude that r1(j1)×· · ·×rS(jS) is contained in Rdj
σ−1
for j ≤ kS = jσ−1(S).
This proves Claim 2.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We prove the theorem by showing the following lemma:
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Lemma D.1. Under Assumptions SS, SY1 and M1 and for j = 0, ..., S − 1, R≤j(z) is
expressed as a union across σ(·) ∈ Σ of Cartesian products, each of which is a product of
intervals that are either (0, 1] or
(
ν
σ(s)
j (zσ(s)), 1
]
for some s = 1, ...S.
This lemma asserts that the region which predicts all equilibria with at most j entrants is
solely determined by the payoffs of players who stay out facing j entering opponents. Given
this lemma, (3.5) holds by Assumption M1.
To prove Lemma D.1, first, consider a pair of Rdj+1(z) and Rdj (z) (for d
j+1 ∈ Mj+1
and dj ∈Mj) in Rj+1(z) and Rj(z), respectively. From the proof of Proposition 3.1(ii), we
know that the elements in dj+1 and dj fall into one of the four types (a′)–(d′) (including s∗),
and thus the corresponding pairs of intervals fall into one of the four types: (a†)
(
0, νsj (zs)
]
and
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
; (b†)
(
0, νsj (zs)
]
and
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
; (c†)
(
νsj+1(zs), 1
]
and
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
; (d†)(
νsj+1(zs), 1
]
and
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
.
Definition D.1. For two Cartesian products R and Q such that R ∼ Q and R ∩ Q = ∅,
their border R ‖ Q is a set that satisfies R ‖ Q ≡ cl(R) ∩ cl(Q). Also, the border R ‖ Q is a
hyper-surface that is common to cl(R) and cl(Q).
By Proposition 3.1, Rdj+1(z) ∼ Rdj (z) and Rdj+1(z)∩Rdj (z) = ∅, and thus their border
can be properly defined. Given (a†)–(d†), we show that Rdj+1(z) ‖ Rdj (z) is a Cartesian
product of
(
0, νsj (zs)
]
‖
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
= {νsj (zs)} (for some s) and other intervals. Specifically,
by applying Proposition D.1(iv) and (v) with R = cl(Rdj+1(z)), Q = cl(Rdj (z)), and rs and
qs being the closures of the intervals in (a
†)–(d†), we have
Rdj+1(z) ‖ Rdj (z) = {νsj (zs)} ×
∏
k 6=s
rk ∩ qk, (D.3)
for some s, where each rk∩qk is one of
[
0, νkj (zk)
]
, {νkj (zk)},
[
νkj (zk), 1
]
, and
[
νkj+1(zk), ν
k
j−1(zk)
]
.
Observe that Rdj+1(z) ‖ Rdj (z) is therefore a lower-dimensional Cartesian product (with di-
mension less than S), which is consistent with the notion of a border or a hyper-surface. Also,
observe that this hyperspace is located at νsj (zs) in the s-coordinate. Likewise, (D.3) holds for
any Rdj+1(z) and Rdj (z) pair with a different value of s and different choice for each rk ∩ qk.
But, since cl(A∪B) = cl(A)∪ cl(B) for any sets A and B, cl(Rj+1(z)) =
⋃
d∈Mj+1 cl(Rd(z))
and cl(Rj(z)) =
⋃
d∈Mj cl(Rd(z)), and thus
Rj+1(z) ‖ Rj(z) =
⋃
dj+1∈Mj+1
⋃
dj∈Mj
(Rdj+1(z) ‖ Rdj (z)) . (D.4)
Now, let R>j(z) ≡ ⋃d∈M>j Rd(z) = U\R≤j(z) where M>j ≡ ⋃Sk=j+1Mk. Note that
R≤j(z) ∼ R>j(z) and R≤j(z) ∩R>j(z) = ∅ by Proposition 3.1. Then R≤j(z) ‖ R>j(z) =
Rj+1(z) ‖ Rj(z) by the discussions around (3.4). Since R≤j(z)∪R>j(z) = U by definition,
R≤j(z) ‖ R>j(z) is the only nontrivial hyper-surface of cl(R≤j(z)) (and of cl(R>j(z))),
i.e., a surface that is not part of the surface of cl(U). Therefore by (D.3) and (D.4), we
can conclude that cl(R≤j(z)) and hence R≤j(z) is a function of z only through νsj (zs) ∀s.
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Moreover, in the expression of Rdk(z) in (3.2) with k ≤ j− 1 (and hence in the expression of
R≤j−1(z)), there is no interval with νsj (zs) in its endpoint by definition.
33 Also, the interval
in the expression of Rdj (z) in (3.2) (and hence in the expression of Rj(z)) that has ν
s
j (zs) in
its endpoints is
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
∀s. Consequently, R≤j(z) = R≤j−1(z) ∪Rj(z) is only expressed
with
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
∀s and (0, 1]. If R≤j(z) is expressed using other intervals whose endpoints
are functions of zs, then it contradicts the fact that R
≤j(z) is a function of z only through
νsj (zs). This completes the proof.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Recall M≤j ≡ M j and M>j ≡ ⋃Sk=j+1Mk. Then the bounds (4.14) and (4.15) can be
rewritten as
Udj = inf
z∈Z
{p˜M>j−1(z) + pM≤j−1(z)} , Ldj = sup
z∈Z
{p˜M≤j (z) + pM>j (z)} ,
where for a set M ⊂ D, p˜M (z) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D ∈M |Z = z] and pM (z) ≡ Pr[D ∈M |Z = z].
Since D = M≤j˜ ∪M>j˜ for some j˜, note that p˜M>j˜ (z) = Pr[Y = 1|Z = z]− p˜M≤j˜ (z). Using
this result, for z, z′ such that
∑S
k=j′+1 h
D
k (z, z
′) = pM>j′ (z)−pM>j′ (z′) > 0 (j′ = 0, ..., S−1),
observe that each term in Udj satisfies
p˜M>j−1(z)− p˜M>j−1(z′) = −p˜M≤j−1(z) + p˜M≤j−1(z′) = Pr[ ≤ µD,U ∈ ∆j(z′, z)]
pM≤j−1(z)− pM≤j−1(z′) = −Pr[U ∈ ∆j(z′, z)]
by (D.8) and (D.11), and thus
p˜M>j−1(z) + pM≤j−1(z)−
{
p˜M>j−1(z
′) + pM≤j−1(z
′)
}
= −Pr[ > µD,U ∈ ∆j(z′, z)] < 0.
Then this relationship creates a partial ordering of p˜M>j−1(z) + pM≤j−1(z) as a function of z
in terms of pM>j′ (z) (for any j
′). According to this ordering, p˜M>j−1(z) + pM≤j−1(z) takes
its smallest value as pM>j′ (z) takes its largest value. Therefore, by (4.17),
Udj = inf
z∈Z
{p˜M>j−1(z) + pM≤j−1(z)} = p˜M>j−1(z¯) + pM≤j−1(z¯).
By a symmetric argument, Ldj = supz∈Z {p˜M≤j (z) + pM>j (z)} = p˜M≤j (z) + pM>j (z).
To prove that these bounds on E[Ydj ] are sharp, it suffices to show that for sj ∈ [Ldj , Udj ],
there exists a density function f∗,U such that the following claims hold:
(A) f∗|U is strictly positive on R.
(B) The proposed model is consistent with the data: ∀j = 0, ..., S
Pr[D ∈M≤j |Z = z] = Pr[U∗ ∈ R≤j(z)],
Pr[Y = 1|D ∈M≤j ,Z = z] = Pr[∗ ≤ µD|U∗ ∈ R≤j(z)],
Pr[Y = 1|D ∈M>j ,Z = z] = Pr[∗ ≤ µD|U∗ ∈ R>j(z)].
33That is, the payoff νsj (zs) is not relevant in defining markets with fewer than j entrants.
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(C) The proposed model is consistent with the specified values of E[Ydj ]: Pr[
∗ ≤ µdj ] = sj .
Theorem 3.1 and the partial ordering above establishes monotonicity of the event U ∈
R≤j(z) (and U ∈ R>j(z)) w.r.t. z. For example, for z, z′ such that pM>j (z) > pM>j (z′),
Theorem 3.1 implies that R≤j(z) ⊂ R≤j(z′) and hence
1[U ∈ R≤j(z′)]− 1[U ∈ R≤j(z)] = 1[U ∈ R≤j(z′)\R≤j(z)]. (D.5)
Given 1[D ∈M≤j ] = 1[U ∈ R≤j(Z)], (D.5) is analogous to a scalar treatment decision D˜ =
1[D˜ = 1] = 1[U˜ ≤ P˜ ] with a scalar instrument P˜ , where 1[U˜ ≤ p′]−1[U˜ ≤ p] = 1[p ≤ U˜ ≤ p′]
for p′ > p. Based on this result and the results for the first part of Theorem 4.1, we can
modify the proof of Theorem 2.1(iii) in Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) to show (A)–(C).
D.4 Proof of Lemma 4.2
We introduce a lemma that establishes the connection between Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.2.
Lemma D.2. Based on the results in Proposition 3.1, h(z, z′;x) ≡∑Sj=0 hj(z, z′, xj) satis-
fies
h(z, z′;x) =
S∑
j=1
ˆ
∆j−1(z′,z)
{ϑj(xj ;u)− ϑj−1(xj−1;u)} du, (D.6)
where ∆j−1(z′, z) ≡ R≤j−1(z′)\R≤j−1(z).
As a special case of this lemma, h(z′, z;x, ..., x) = h(z′, z, x) =
∑S
j=0 hj(z
′, z, x) can be
expressed as
h(z′, z, x) =
S∑
j=1
ˆ
∆j−1(z′,z)
{ϑj(x;u)− ϑj−1(x;u)} du. (D.7)
We prove Lemma D.2 by drawing on the results of Proposition 3.1. By Theorem 3.1, for
z and z′ such that (4.4) holds, we have
Rj(z) ⊆ Rj(z′) (D.8)
for j = 0, ..., S, includingRS(z) = RS(z′) = U as a trivial case. For those z and z′, introduce
notations34
∆j,+(z, z
′) ≡ Rj(z)\Rj(z′), (D.9)
∆j,−(z, z′) ≡ Rj(z′)\Rj(z), (D.10)
and
∆j(z′, z) ≡ Rj(z′)\Rj(z). (D.11)
34Note that ∆+(z,z
′) and ∆−(z,z′) defined in Section 4.2 for the S = 2 are simplified versions of these
notations: ∆+(z,z
′) = ∆1,+(z,z′) and ∆−(z,z′) = ∆1,−(z,z′).
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Note that, for j = 1, ..., S,
Rj(·) = Rj(·)\Rj−1(·), (D.12)
since Rj(z) ≡ ⋃jk=0Rk(z). Fix j = 1, ..., S. Consider
∆j,+(z, z
′) =
(
Rj(z) ∩Rj−1(z)c) ∩ (Rj(z′) ∩Rj−1(z′)c)c
=
(
Rj(z) ∩Rj−1(z)c) ∩ (Rj(z′)c ∪Rj−1(z′))
=
(
Rj(z) ∩Rj−1(z)c ∩Rj(z′)c) ∪ (Rj(z) ∩Rj−1(z)c ∩Rj−1(z′))
=
{(
Rj(z)\Rj(z′)) ∩Rj−1(z)c} ∪ {(Rj−1(z′)\Rj−1(z)) ∩Rj(z)}
= ∆j−1(z′, z) ∩Rj(z),
where the first equality is by plugging in (D.12) into (D.9), the third equality is by the
distributive law, and the last equality is by (D.8) and hence
(
Rj(z)\Rj(z′))∩Rj−1(z)c = ∅.
But
∆j−1(z′, z) ∩Rj(z) = ∆j−1(z′, z)\ (∆j−1(z′, z)\Rj(z)) .
Symmetrically, by changing the role of z and z′, consider
∆j,−(z′, z) =
(
Rj(z′) ∩Rj−1(z′)c) ∩ (Rj(z) ∩Rj−1(z)c)c
=
{(
Rj(z′)\Rj(z)) ∩Rj−1(z′)c} ∪ {(Rj−1(z)\Rj−1(z′)) ∩Rj(z′)}
= ∆j(z′, z) ∩Rj−1(z′)c,
where the last equality is by (D.8) that Rj−1(z) ⊂ Rj−1(z′). But
∆j(z′, z) ∩Rj−1(z′)c = ∆j(z′, z)\ (∆j(z′, z) ∩Rj−1(z′)) .
Note that
∆j−1(z′, z)\Rj(z) = ∆j(z′, z)\Rj−1(z′) ≡ A∗, (D.13)
because
∆j−1(z′, z)\Rj(z) = Rj−1(z′) ∩Rj−1(z)c ∩Rj(z)c = Rj−1(z′) ∩Rj(z)c
= Rj(z′) ∩Rj(z)c ∩Rj−1(z′) = ∆j(z′, z) ∩Rj−1(z′),
where the second equality is by Rj−1(z) ⊂ Rj(z) and the third equality is by Rj−1(z′) ⊂
Rj(z′). In sum,
∆j,+(z, z
′) = ∆j−1(z′, z)\A∗, ∆j,−(z, z′) = ∆j(z′, z)\A∗. (D.14)
(D.14) shows how the outflow (∆j,+(z, z
′)) and inflow (∆j,−(z, z′)) of Rj can be written
in terms of the inflows of Rj−1 and Rj , respectively. And figuratively, A∗ adjusts for the
“leakage” when the change from z to z′ is relatively large. Now, with ϑj(u) ≡ ϑj(x;u) ≡
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ϑ(ej , x;u), (4.20) can be expressed as
ˆ
Rj(z)
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
Rj(z′)
ϑj(u)du
=
ˆ
∆j,+(z,z′)
ϑj(u)du+
ˆ
Rj(z)∩Rj(z′)
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
∆j,−(z,z′)
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
Rj(z)∩Rj(z′)
ϑj(u)du
=
ˆ
∆j,+(z,z′)
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
∆j,−(z,z′)
ϑj(u)du, (D.15)
where the last equality is derived by IN and SY. First, for j = 1, ..., S, by (D.14),
ˆ
∆j,+(z,z′)
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
∆j,−(z,z′)
ϑj(u)du =
ˆ
∆j(z′,z)\A∗
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
∆j(z′,z)\A∗
ϑj(u)du
=
ˆ
∆j−1(z′,z)\A∗
ϑj(u)du+
ˆ
A∗
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
A∗
ϑj(u)du
−
{ˆ
∆j(z′,z)\A∗
ϑj(u)du+
ˆ
A∗
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
A∗
ϑj(u)du
}
=
ˆ
∆j−1(z′,z)
ϑj(u)du−
ˆ
∆j(z′,z)
ϑj(u)du, (D.16)
where the last equality is because ∆j−1(z′, z) ⊃ A∗ and ∆j(z′, z) ⊃ A∗ by the definition of
A∗.
For j = 0,
ˆ
∆0,+(z,z′)
ϑ0(u)du−
ˆ
∆0,−(z,z′)
ϑ0(u)du = −
ˆ
∆0(z′,z)
ϑ0(u)du, (D.17)
since ∆0,+(z, z
′) = ∅ by the choice of (z, z′) and ∆0,−(z, z′) = ∆0(z′, z). For j = S,
ˆ
∆S,+(z,z′)
ϑS(u)du−
ˆ
∆S,−(z,z′)
ϑS(u)du =
ˆ
∆S−1(z′,z)
ϑS(u)du, (D.18)
since ∆S,−(z, z′) = ∅ by the choice of (z, z′) and ∆S,+(z, z′) = ∆S−1(z′, z). Then combining
(4.20) and (D.15)–(D.18) evaluated at x = xj ,
h(z, z′;x) ≡
S∑
j=0
hj(z, z
′, xj) =
S∑
j=1
ˆ
∆j−1(z′,z)
{ϑj(xj ;u)− ϑj−1(xj−1;u)} du.
This completes the proof of Lemma D.2.
Now we prove 4.2. Part (i) is already shown in the text, so we prove part (ii) here. By
Lemma D.2, h(z, z′;x) =
∑S
j=1
´
∆j−1(z′,z) {ϑj(xj ;u)− ϑj−1(xj−1;u)} du with ∆j−1(z′, z) ≡
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R¯j−1(z′)\R¯j−1(z), which can be rewritten as
h(z, z′;x)−
∑
k 6=j
ˆ
∆k−1(z′,z)
{ϑk(xk;u)− ϑk−1(xk−1;u)} du
=
ˆ
∆j−1(z′,z)
{ϑj(xj ;u)− ϑj−1(xj−1;u)} du. (D.19)
We prove the case ι = 1; the proof for the other cases follows symmetrically. For k 6= j, when
ϑk−1(xk−1;u)−ϑk(xk;u) > 0 a.e. u, it satisfies−
´
∆k−1(z′,z) {ϑk(xk;u)− ϑk−1(xk−1;u)} du >
0. Combining with h(z, z′;x) > 0 implies that the l.h.s. of (D.19) is positive. This implies
that ϑj(x;u)−ϑj−1(x;u) > 0 a.e. u. Suppose not and suppose ϑj(xj ;u)−ϑj−1(xj−1;u) ≤ 0
with positive probability. Then by Assumption Y, ϑj(x;u)− ϑj−1(x;u) ≤ 0 a.e. u, which is
contradiction.
D.5 Proof of Lemma 5.1
The claim is that when (5.2) holds, it satisfies Rdj (z) ∩ Rd˜j (z′) = ∅ for dj 6= d˜j . But the
latter is equivalent to Assumption ASY by the first part of the proof of Lemma 5.2 below.
We first prove the claim for S = 2 and then generalize it. The probabilities in (5.2) equal
Pr[D = (0, 0)|Z = z] = Pr[U ∈ R00(z)],
Pr[D = (1, 1)|Z = z′] = Pr[U ∈ R11(z′)].
Under independent unobserved types, these probabilities are equivalent to the volume of
R00(z) and R11(z
′), respectively. We consider two isoquant curves: a curve that delivers
the same volume as R00(z) with origin (1, 1) and a curve for R11(z
′) with origin (0, 0) in U .
Consider an extreme scenario along these isoquant curves. Namely, consider the situation
that player 1 is unprofitable to enter irrespective of player 2’s decisions when Z = z. Then
U = R˜00(z) ∪ R˜01(z) where Pr[U ∈ R˜00(z)] = Pr[U ∈ R00(z)]. Also, consider a situation
that player 1 is profitable to enter irrespective of player 2’s decisions when Z = z′. Then U =
R˜10(z
′)∪R˜11(z′) where Pr[U ∈ R˜11(z′)] = Pr[U ∈ R11(z′)]. In order for R˜01(z)∩R˜10(z′) = ∅,
it must be that
1− Pr[U ∈ R˜00(z)] = Pr[U ∈ R˜01(z)] < 1− Pr[U ∈ R˜10(z′)] = Pr[U ∈ R˜11(z′)]
or equivalently, 1 − Pr[U ∈ R00(z)] < Pr[U ∈ R11(z′)] should hold. But note that if
R˜01(z) ∩ R˜10(z′) = ∅, then R01(z) ∩ R10(z′) = ∅ for any R01(z) and R10(z′) along the
isoquant curves, since R01(z) ⊂ R˜01(z) and R10(z′) ⊂ R˜10(z′). Symmetrically one can show
R10(z) ∩R01(z′) = ∅.
To prove the general case for S > 2, we iteratively apply the argument for the two
players case. Consider two isoquant hyper-surfaces, one with origin (1, ..., 1) for Rd0(z) and
the other with origin (0,...,0) for RdS (z). Consider a scenario where the first S − 1 players
are unprofitable to enter irrespective of the remaining player’s decision when Z = z. Then
U = R˜d0(z)∪R˜0,...,0,1(z) where Pr[U ∈ R˜d0(z)] = Pr[U ∈ Rd0(z)]. Also, consider a situation
where the first S − 1 players are profitable irrespective of the remaining player’s decision
when Z = z′. Then U = R˜1,...,1,0(z′) ∪ R˜dS (z′) where Pr[U ∈ R˜dS (z′)] = Pr[U ∈ RdS (z′)].
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Then when (5.1) holds, R˜0,...,0,1(z) ∩ R˜1,...,1,0(z′) = ∅. Note that R˜0,...,0,1(z) ⊃ Rd−s,1(z)
for any Rd−s,1(z) with d−s 6= (1, ..., 1) and R˜1,...,1,0(z′) ⊃ Rd−s,0(z′) for any Rd−s,0(z′) with
d−s 6= (0, ..., 0) by Proposition 3.1. Therefore Rd−s,1(z) ∩ Rd−s,0(z′) 6= 0 for dj and d˜j such
that dj 6= d˜j , dj = (d−s, 1) and d˜j = (d−s, 0) for j = 1, ..., S − 1. Since the same argument
applies irrelevant of which S − 1 players we choose from the outset, Rdj (z)∩Rd˜j (z′) = ∅ for
dj 6= d˜j as it is desired.
D.6 Proof of Lemma 5.2
The first part proves the claim in Remark 5.1. For any dj and d˜j (dj 6= d˜j), the expres-
sion of Rdj (z) ∩ Rd˜j (z′) can be inferred as follows. First, there exists s∗ such that djs∗ = 1
and d˜js∗ = 0, otherwise it contradicts d
j 6= d˜j . That is, Us∗ ∈
(
0, νs
∗
j−1(zs∗)
]
in Rdj (z) and
Us∗ ∈
(
νs
∗
j (z
′
s∗), 1
]
in Rd˜j (z
′). For other s 6= s∗, the pair is realized to be one of the four
types: (i) djs = 1 and d˜
j
s = 0; (ii) d
j
s = 0 and d˜
j
s = 1; (iii) d
j
s = 1 and d˜
j
s = 1; (iv) d
j
s = 0 and
d˜js = 0. Then the corresponding pair of intervals for Rdj (z) and Rd˜j (z
′), respectively, falls
into one of the four types: (i)
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
and
(
νsj (z
′
s), 1
]
; (ii)
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
and
(
0, νsj−1(z
′
s)
]
;
(iii)
(
0, νsj−1(zs)
]
and
(
0, νsj−1(z
′
s)
]
; (iv)
(
νsj (zs), 1
]
and
(
νsj (z
′
s), 1
]
. Then by Proposition
D.1(iv), Rdj (z)∩Rd˜j (z) is a product of the intersections of the interval pairs. But the inter-
sections resulting from (i) and (ii) are empty and hence Rdj (z) ∩ Rd˜j (z′) = ∅ if and only if
νsj−1(zs) ≤ νsj (z′s) ∀s. Finally, note that Rdj (z) ∩Rd˜j (z′) = ∅ implies R∗dj (z) ∩R∗d˜j (z′) = ∅.
Now, we prove Lemma 5.2 with binary Y , no X and S = 2 for simplicity; the general case
can be easily shown by analogously modifying the proof of Lemma 4.2. In place of hM (z, z
′)
that is used to prove Lemma 4.1, introduce
h10(z, z
′) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 0)|Z = z]− Pr[Y = 1,D = (1, 0)|Z = z′],
h01(z, z
′) ≡ Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 1)|Z = z]− Pr[Y = 1,D = (0, 1)|Z = z′].
Then h defined in (4.3) satisfies h = h11 + h00 + h10 + h01; in fact, hM = h10 + h01. Let R
∗
10
and R∗01 be the regions that predict D = (1, 0) and D = (0, 1), respectively. For (z, z′) such
that (4.4) holds, we have R11(z) ⊃ R11(z′) and R00(z) ⊂ R00(z′), respectively, by Theorem
3.1. Since R∗10 ∪R∗01 = R10 ∪R01 = R1, (4.7) and (4.8) can alternatively be expressed as
∆+(z, z
′) ≡ {R∗10(z) ∪R∗01(z)} \R1(z′), (D.20)
∆−(z, z′) ≡
{
R∗10(z
′) ∪R∗01(z′)
} \R1(z). (D.21)
Consider partitions ∆+(z, z
′) = ∆1+(z, z′)∪∆2+(z, z′) and ∆−(z, z′) = ∆1−(z, z′)∪∆2−(z, z′)
such that
∆1+(z, z
′) ≡ R∗10(z)\R1(z′), ∆2+(z, z′) ≡ R∗01(z)\R1(z′),
∆1−(z, z
′) ≡ R∗10(z′)\R1(z), ∆2−(z, z′) ≡ R∗01(z′)\R1(z).
That is, ∆1+(z, z
′) and ∆1−(z, z′) are regions of R∗10 exchanged with the regions for D = (0, 0)
and D = (1, 1), respectively, and ∆2+(z, z
′) and ∆2−(z, z′) are for R∗01.
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By Assumption IN,
h10(z, z
′) = Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ R∗10(z)]− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ R∗10(z′)]
= Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ R∗10(z)\R∗10(z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ R∗10(z′)\R∗10(z)]
= Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆1+(z, z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆1−(z, z′)]
= Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆1+(z, z′) ∪A∗]− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆1−(z, z′) ∪A∗],
where A∗ is defined in (D.13), the second equality is by (4.10) and the third equality is by
the following derivation:
R∗10(z)\R∗10(z′) =
[{
R∗10(z) ∩R1(z′)c
} \R∗10(z′)] ∪ [{R∗10(z) ∩R1(z′)} \R∗10(z′)]
=
[{
R∗10(z) ∩R1(z′)c
}] ∪ [{R∗10(z′) ∩R1(z)} \R∗10(z′)]
= ∆1+(z, z
′),
where the first equality is by the distributive law and U = R1(z′)c∪R1(z′), the second equal-
ity is by R1(z
′)c = R∗10(z′)c ∩R∗01(z′)c (the first term) and by Assumption ASY (the second
term), and the last equality is by the definition of ∆1+(z, z
′) and {R∗10(z′) ∩R1(z)} \R∗10(z′)
being empty. Analogously, one can show that R∗10(z′)\R∗10(z) = ∆1−(z, z′) using Assumption
ASY and the definition of ∆1−(z, z′). Likewise,
h01(z, z
′) = Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ R∗01(z)]− Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ R∗01(z′)]
= Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ R∗01(z)\R∗01(z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ R∗01(z′)\R∗01(z)]
= Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ ∆2+(z, z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ ∆2−(z, z′)].
Also, by the definitions of the partitions,
h11(z, z
′) = Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ ∆−(z, z′) ∪A∗]
= Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ ∆1−(z, z′) ∪A∗] + Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ ∆2−(z, z′)]
and
h00(z, z
′) = −Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ ∆+(z, z′) ∪A∗]
= −Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ ∆1+(z, z′) ∪A∗]− Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ ∆2+(z, z′)].
Now combining all the terms yields
h(z, z′) = Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ ∆1−(z, z′) ∪A∗]− Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆1−(z, z′) ∪A∗]
+ Pr[ ≤ µ11,U ∈ ∆2−(z, z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ ∆2−(z, z′)]
+ Pr[ ≤ µ10,U ∈ ∆1+(z, z′) ∪A∗]− Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ ∆1+(z, z′) ∪A∗]
+ Pr[ ≤ µ01,U ∈ ∆2+(z, z′)]− Pr[ ≤ µ00,U ∈ ∆2+(z, z′)].
Then by Assumption M, µ1,d−s − µ0,d−s share the same signs for all s and ∀d−s ∈ {0, 1} and
therefore sgn{h(z, z′)} = sgn{µ1,d−s − µ0,d−s}.
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D.7 Proof of Theorem 7.1
For given j = 0, ..., S − 1, consider
E[Y |Z = z]− E[Y |Z = z′]
= E
[
YM≤j + 1[D(z) ∈M>j ] {YM>j − YM≤j}
]− E [YM≤j + 1[D(z′) ∈M>j ] {YM>j − YM≤j}]
= E
[{
1[D(z) ∈M>j ]− 1[D(z′) ∈M>j ]} {YM>j − YM≤j}]
= E[YM>j − YM≤j |D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ] Pr[D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ]
− E[YM>j − YM≤j |D(z) ∈M≤j ,D(z′) ∈M>j ] Pr[D(z) ∈M≤j ,D(z′) ∈M>j ]
= E[YM>j − YM≤j |D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ] Pr[D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ], (D.22)
where the first equality plugs in Y = 1[D ∈M>j ]YM>j+
{
1− 1[D ∈M>j ]}YM≤j and applies
Assumption IN, and the last equality is by supposing that the result of Lemma 7.1 is satisfied
with
Pr[D(z) ∈M≤j ,D(z′) ∈M>j ] = 0. (D.23)
But note that
Pr[D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M≤j ] = Pr[D(z) ∈M>j ]− Pr[D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M>j ],
where Pr[D(z) ∈M>j ,D(z′) ∈M>j ] = Pr[D(z′) ∈M>j ] by (D.23). Combining this result
with (D.22) yields the desired result.
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Figure 7: Illustration of equilibrium regions in treatment selection process (Proposition 3.1)
for three players (S = 3).
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Figure 8: Depicting the regions of multiple equilibria for three players (S = 3).
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Figure 9: The region of LATE subgroup for two players (S = 2).
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Figure 10: Bounds on the ATE with different strength of vector Z = (Z1, Z2) of binary
instruments when X takes three different values (|X | = 3).
This figure (and the next) depicts the simulated bounds for E[Y11 − Y00|X = 0] = 0.2 (the straight
dotted line). The horizontal axis is the value of the coefficients on the instruments (γ1 = γ2 = γ). The
stronger the instruments, the narrower the bounds are. The cross lines are Manski (1990)’s bounds.
The red solid lines are our bounds using only the variation of Z, which identify the sign of the ATE.
The blue circle lines are bounds where the variation of X, the exogenous variable excluded from the
treatment selection process, is also used. Lastly, the green solid line is the simulated TSLS estimand
assuming a linear simultaneous equations model.
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Figure 11: Bounds with different strength of vector Z = (Z1, Z2) of binary instrument when
X takes fifteen different values (|X | = 15).
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Figure 12: Bounds under Different Strength of X with |X | = 15.
The horizontal axis is the value of the coefficient on the exogenous variable X excluded from the
treatment selection process. The jumps in the bounds when both the variations of Z and X are
used (the blue circle lines) are because different inequalities are involved for different values of the
coefficient; see the text for details.
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Figure 13: Bounds under Different Strength of Interaction with |X | = 3.
The horizontal axis is the value of the coefficients on the opponents’ decisions (δ1 = δ2 = δ). The
smaller the interaction effects, the narrower the bounds are. Again, the jumps in the bounds when
both the variations of Z and X are used (the blue circle lines) are because different inequalities are
involved for different values of the coefficient.
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